The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy. A Legal Cultural Revolution by Claus D. Ehlermann
RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy.




EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTERSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann
All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
without permission of the authors.
© 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann
Printed in Italy in April 2000
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI)
ItalyRSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann
Abstract
The White Paper on modernisation of EC antitrust policy suggests a radical
departure from the existing system. According to Regulation No.17/62,
agreements that fall under Article 81 (1), and are, therefore, prohibited, can only
be exempted from this prohibition by the Commission, if they have been
notified. Because of the Commission’s exemption monopoly, Article 81 (3) has
no direct effect. The White Paper proposes to abolish the existing system of
notifications and the Commission’s exemption monopoly. Instead, it suggests
that Article 81 (3) should become directly effective, so that in can be applied
also by national competition authorities and courts.
The White Paper raises a series of delicate legal and political issues that have
been widely discussed. The present article presents these issues and examines
them in depth.
The article shares the White Papers’ conviction that a fundamental reform is
needed, and that other options will not achieve the desired results.  It agrees with
the White Papers’ objectives, and explains why the reform will not weaken the
enforcement of EC antitrust rules. Contrary to the opinion of some critics, the
reform is not incompatible with Article 81, and Article 81  (3) is capable of
having direct effect.
With respect to legal security, the reform presents advantages and
disadvantages. On the one hand, the abolition of the requirement of formal
exemption decisions will increase legal security, as agreements will be valid if
the conditions of Article 81 (3) are fulfilled. On the other hand, undertakings
loose the possibility to request and obtain such decisions and their substitute, the
so-called comfort letters. Is the Commission right to restrict severely the
adoption of positive decisions in individual cases, recognising that the
conditions of Article 81 (3) are fulfilled? Or should a system of voluntary
notifications and requests for positive decisions (or an equivalent for the
traditional comfort letters) be introduced? The article argues in favour of a less
restrictive attitude than that taken by the Commission, though recognising that
the existing system should not be re-introduced through the backdoor.
In spite of its pleading for radical decentralisation, the White Paper excludes
positive decisions in individual cases taken by national competition authorities.
It fears divergent national decisions, and the ensuing risks for the consistency of
EC competition policy. However, the exclusion is hardly compatible with the
concept of a network of competition authorities.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 2
Radical decentralisation, leading to a considerable increase of authorities and
courts applying Article 81 (3), will obviously give rise to differences in
interpretation and application. The White Paper proposes a series of information,
coordination and cooperation mechanisms to minimise these risks. The article
agrees fundamentally with these suggestions, though they appear to be relatively
“soft”. They may, however, be reinforced, in the light of practical experience, at
a later stage.
The reform suggested by the White Paper will increase the responsibility of
judges. The article does not share the doubts that judges are not qualified, or that
judicial procedures are not adapted to handle the direct application of Article 81
(3). If additional reforms are needed, they can be introduced, again, at a later
stage.
The White Paper underestimates, however, the difficulties for the accession
candidates. These difficulties should be addressed through transitional
arrangements.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 3
INTRODUCTION
1.  The White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the EC Treaty (the White Paper) of May 1999
1 is the most
important policy paper the Commission has ever published in the more
than 40 years of EC competition policy. It suggests a legal and cultural
revolution in proposing a fundamental reorganisation of the existing
responsibilities between the Commission, national antitrust authorities
and national courts. The central piece of the reform is the abolition of the
Commission’s exclusive responsibility for granting exemptions according
to Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty. The Commission does not propose to
share this responsibility with other, i. e. national, administrative antitrust
authorities, like the Office of Fair Trading or the Bundeskartellamt.
Instead, it suggests eliminating totally the requirement of any
administrative exemption decision. It takes the view that Article 81 (3)
should become directly effective
2, so that any administrative authority,
court or tribunal can apply it. That is the legal side of the revolution.
2.  At the same time, the White Paper breaks with the traditional belief that
the exclusive responsibility of the Commission for granting exemptions is
a sort of “natural” Commission monopoly. During 40 years, the
Commission – and its Directorate General Competition (the famous DG
IV
3) - have defended the view that only a central EC authority could
determine whether the conditions for an exemption are fulfilled. Article
81 (3) requires not only a careful determination of often highly complex
economic facts. This paragraph demands also a delicate balancing and
weighting of different, possibly contradictory elements, of arguments for
and against a restrictive agreement. For this purpose, Article 81 (3) leaves
a relatively large room for discretionary decision making. Until the
adoption of the White Paper, the Commission, its DG IV and the vast
majority of EC competition experts held the view that only the
Commission is qualified to proceed with this balancing and weighting
exercise. Even a sharing of responsibilities under Article 81 (3) with
national antitrust authorities was considered to be dangerous and
incompatible with the necessary coherence and consistency of EC
                                                          
1 OJ C 132, 12. 5. 1999, p. 1.
2 The White Paper uses the terms “directly applicable” and “direct applicability”. This paper
will instead use throughout the text “directly effective” and “direct effect”, except in passages
quoted verbatim from the White Paper.
3 Throughout this text, the traditional designation “DG IV” has been maintained for reasons of
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competition law and policy.
4 In DG IV, the “natural” monopoly theory
was an almost religious belief. It constituted for four decades DG IV’s
main credo. Not to adhere to it was considered to be heresy and could lead
to excommunication. A departure from this dogmatic position is the
“cultural” side of the revolution initiated by the White Paper. It is, by the
way, a convincing illustration that the widely held view according to
which “Eurocrats” have only one main aim, i. e. to increase their own
influence and power, is wrong.
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE EC TREATY
AND OF REGULATION NO. 17/62
3.  Before examining the White Paper and its problems in more detail, it is
useful to recall the architecture of the EC Treaty and of Regulation No.
17/62
5, i. e. the major implementing regulation for Articles 81 (and 82).
4.  Article 81 (1) prohibits “all agreements between undertakings, … which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market…” Article 81 (2) provides that “any agreements  …
prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void”. Article 81
(3) states that “the provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared
inapplicable in the case of any agreement … which contributes to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefit, and which does not a) impose on the undertaking
concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question”.
                                                          
4 I myself have pleaded repeatedly in favour of the maintaining the Commission’s monopoly;
see in particular Ehlermann (1996), p. 93 – 95. My position was, however, based on the
conviction that the time for a change was not yet ripe. This results clearly from the
consideration that the movement towards a limitation of the Commission’s monopoly could
start sooner in the area of vertical restraints, where a convergence of views would be easier to
achieve, than in the field of horizontal restrictions of competition. In the forefront of my mind
was the sharing the power of exemption with national competition authorities. But a more
radical approach, i. e. the recognition of direct effect, was not excluded, as is shown by the
reference to the territorial effects of decisions taken by a national judge (see p. 94).
5 Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 February 1962 (First Regulation implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty), OJ 35, 10.5.1962, p. 118 (special Edition 1959-62, p. 132).RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 5
5.  It is remarkable that Article 81 (3) does not say who may declare the
provisions of paragraph 1 to be inapplicable. Article 81 of the EC Treaty
differs in this respect significantly from the corresponding article of the
ECSC Treaty. Article 65 (4) ECSC Treaty specifies that “the High
Authority shall have sole jurisdiction, subject to the right to bring actions
before the Court, to rule whether any such agreement … is compatible
with this Article”. The attribution of the responsibility to adopt
implementing rules for Article 81 – and its paragraph 3 in particular – is
left to the Council. According to Article 83, it is the task of the Council
“to adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the
principles set out in Article 81 … “. Article 83 (2) states that these
regulations or directives “shall be designed in particular … (b) to lay
down detailed rules for the application of Article 81 (3), taking into
account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to
simplify administration to the greatest possible extent on the other”. It is
also noteworthy that Article 84 provides that “until the entry into force of
the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article 83, the authorities of the
Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements … in
accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions of
Article 81, in particular paragraph 3 …”. Until the entry into force of
Regulation No. 17/62, the responsibility for granting exemptions under
Article 81 (3) lay therefore with national authorities, and not with the
Commission
6.
6.  It was Regulation No. 17/62 that established the Commission’s monopoly
to apply Article 81 (3), and the corresponding requirement of prior
notification of the agreements for which an exemption is requested.
According to Article 9 (1) of Regulation No. 17/62, “… the Commission
shall have sole power to declare Article 81 (1) inapplicable pursuant o
Article 81 (3) of the Treaty”. No similar monopoly exists for the
implementation of Article 81 (1). National competition authorities are
allowed (according to Article 9 (3) of Regulation No. 17/62) to apply the
provisions of this paragraph – possibly together with national competition
law – as long as the Commission has not formally initiated an
investigation procedure. The same is true for national courts. They are
even obliged to apply Article 81 (1), as this provision has been recognised
by the Court of Justice to be directly effective.
7 In both respects, the EC
Treaty differs from the ECSC Treaty which leaves no place for
                                                          
6 The same is still true in those very limited areas for which the Council has not made use of
Article 83, like air transport between the EU and third countries.
7 CJ, 30 January 1974, Case 127/73 BRT v. SABAM [1974] ECR 51, para. 15.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 6
enforcement activities by national competition authorities nor by national
courts, be it under ECSC or national law
8.
7.  The EC Treaty opens therefore more room for national application of EC
competition rules and national competition law than the ECSC Treaty.
The EC Treaty and Regulation No. 17/62 together establish, however, an
unusual degree of centralisation if one compares the competition sector
with other areas of Community law. As a general rule, national authorities
apply Community law. The competition sector is the only one in which
the Commission is entrusted with the application of Community rules to
individual undertakings. Even more extraordinary is the existence of an
implementation monopoly, like that for exemption decisions under Article
81 (3).
8.  If and to what extent the EC Treaty requires a system of prior
administrative authorisation decision will be examined shortly. At this
stage, it is appropriate to note that Regulation No. 17/62 corresponded to
the needs, but also to the concepts and perspectives of the early years of
the EC. The EC was certainly intended to be a much less centralised
system than the ECSC. However, the dominant legal and administrative
culture of the EC of the “Six” was still rather centralist. France was
clearly the politically dominant Member State. French views influenced
heavily EC legislation and administration. French preoccupations about
“uniformity” (and not only “coherence” or “consistency”) of the EC’s
legal order were pervasive. In addition, there were hardly any
administrative structures in the Member States that would have allowed
an efficient decentralised application of EC competition law in general,
and of Article 81 (3) in particular. Even if such structures had already
been present, it would have been too risky to share the responsibility for
exemption decisions with national authorities. During the first decades of
the EC, there was no “competition culture” comparable to the one we
have today. French planning concepts were opposed to Germany’s Soziale
Marktwirtschaft. The presence and interference of the Member States in
their respective economies were increasing, instead of decreasing. The
promoters of an active industrial policy were in most Member States more
influential than the advocates of a rigorous competition policy. The
defenders of competition as a regulatory process, and competition policy
as an indispensable instrument to defend this regulatory process, were
therefore lucky to see the responsibility for exemption decisions attributed
to the sole Commission.
                                                          
8 Contrary to Articles 81 (1) and 82 EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 ECSC Treaty have no
direct effect. See CJ, 13 April 1994, Case C-128/92 Banks v. British Coal Corporation [1994]
ECR I-1209, para. 17 and 18.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 7
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMISSION’S
EXEMPTION MONOPOLY
9.  The consequences of the entry into force of Regulation No. 17/62 are well
known
9. The Commission was swamped by more than 34 500
notifications, requesting negative clearances and/or exemptions according
to Article 81 (3). In order to avoid a total administrative paralysis, the
Commission adopted regulations exempting en bloc groups of (however
narrowly defined) agreements, in particular of vertical restraints of
competition. In addition, the Commission published notices and
communications which signalled a de facto green light for certain types of
agreements, like the successive “de minimis” notices. Finally, DG IV
developed the informal instrument of so-called “comfort letters” which
took largely the place of formal Commission decisions. Formal exemption
decisions remained extremely rare
10. During the last years, the average of
such decisions has not exceeded 5 per year. In addition, DG IV was never
able to eliminate totally the backlog that had built up since the first wave
of notifications. Shortly before I arrived in DG IV, at the end of 1989, the
statistics showed a backlog of 3 239 notifications that were waiting for
some kind of formal or informal decision. 5 years later, at the end of
1994, a few months before I left DG IV, the backlog amounted still to
1052 notifications
11. Since 1994, the backlog has remained broadly the
same
12.
10.  During the first two decades, this situation was more or less accepted. DG
IV’s administrative difficulties were probably considered to be some kind
of “teething problems”. However, the situation changed during the
eighties. DG IV became the object of increasing criticism, both from a
substantive and a procedural point of view. Substantive criticism focussed
on legal formalism, particularly with respect to the appreciation of vertical
agreements. Procedural criticism centred on the backlog, the length of
procedures, insufficient transparency and motivation of comfort letters, as
well as the lack of legal effects of such letters. In the beginning, this
criticism was mainly external to the Commission. Progressively, it was
                                                          
9 See for the following the detailed description of Goyder (1998), p. 34 et seq.
10 Forrester (1999) mentions a total of 222 decisions since the adoption of Regulation
No.17/62. See his paper also for a short, but lively account of the existing system and its
deficiencies.
11 European Commission, XXIVth Report on Competition Policy 1994, p. 629, and p. 630
(for the preceding years).
12 See the last published Competition Report: European Commission, XXVIIIth Report on
Competition Policy 1998, p 399.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 8
also voiced within the Commission’s departments, in particular in DG IV
itself.
11.  With the beginning of the nineties, the criticism of DG IV’s way of
dealing with notifications under Article 81 (3) grew stronger and stronger.
The positive experiences made under the new Merger Regulation
13
seemed to prove that DG IV was perfectly capable of adopting well
motivated, formal decisions in complicated cases within very short
deadlines. If the Commission was not able to exercise satisfactorily its
responsibilities under its monopoly for exemption decisions, established
by Regulation No. 17/62, the monopoly should be reduced in scope
(through a more realistic interpretation of Article 81 (1)), or shared with
national competition authorities. A sharing of the monopoly was
requested, in particular, by the Bundeskartellamt and the German
government
14. In support of their request, they invoked the subsidiarity
principle
15 that the Treaty of Maastricht had just elevated to the rank of
one of the principles of the EC Treaty. The more radical solution, i. e. the
total abolishment of any prior administrative exemption decision under
Article 81 (3), was, however. Rarely suggested and discussed
16.
12.  Until the adoption of the White Paper, the Commission’s reactions to
suggestions to tinker with its exemption monopoly were totally negative.
The Commission favoured the decentralised application of Article 81 (1),
first by adopting the Notice on cooperation with national courts of
February 1993
17 and later by publishing the Notice on cooperation with
national competition authorities of October 1997
18. However, both notices
take the exemption monopoly of the Commission for granted. Both
notices deal therefore with the decentralised treatment of complaints, not
of notifications. Both notices take care not to jeopardise the
Commission’s sole responsibility to grant exemptions under Article 81
(3). This is particularly apparent in the Notice on cooperation with
national competition authorities, which emphasises conspicuously the
obligations that flow from the Commission’s exemption monopoly in case
of complaints against notified agreements. That notifications can and will
                                                          
13 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p.1.
14 For detailed references see Ehlermann (1996), p. 90.
15 Article 5 EC Treaty.
16 An exception is Kon (1982), p. 541 – 56, opposed by Steindorff (1983), p. 125 - 130.
17 Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty, OJ C 39, 13. 2. 1993, p.6.
18 Notice on cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission in
handling cases falling within the scope of Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 313, 15.
10. 1997, p 3.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 9
be made to prevent negative court judgements, or administrative
decisions, is evident. If their dilatory character is obvious, it is relatively
easy to justify that DG IV puts them aside, and does not initiate a formal
investigation procedure, in order to avoid the blocking effect of such a
decision. It is much more difficult to argue that the Commission is
allowed to remain passive if the dilatory character of the notification is
not apparent. Is it legitimate to establish some sort of public interest
doctrine in the treatment of notifications, following the example of the
treatment of complaints, according to the Automec II jurisprudence
19? Is
the Commission entitled to delay deliberately the initiation of a formal
procedure for the examination of notifications that probably do not lead to
positive exemption decisions, thus facilitating prohibition decisions by
national competition authorities? I believe that such a doctrine can be
justified
20. However, the risk that the Court of Justice will not accept it,
can hardly be denied. The retention of the Commission’s exemption
monopoly therefore constitutes a serious limit to the ability of national
competition authorities to pursue actively even apparently well-founded
complaints.
13.  In view of the – at least implicit - defence of the Commission’s sole
responsibility to grant exemptions under Article 81(3) in the Notice on
cooperation with national competition authorities of October 1997, it is
not surprising that also the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints of January
1997
21 was still based on the assumption that the Commission’s monopoly
will remain in place.
14.  The White Paper was adopted by the Commission at the end of April
1999. It might have been adopted even earlier, if the Santer Commission
had not decided to resign in March 1999. The White Paper precedes thus
Council Regulation (EC) 1215/1999 of June 1999 authorising the
Commission to adopt a broad block exemption that implements the
conclusions of the discussions triggered by the Green Paper on Vertical
                                                          
19 CFI, 18 February 1992, Case T-24/90 Automec v. Commission [1992]ECR II-2223, in
particular paras. 77 and 87.
20 See Ehlermann (1996), p. 93. See also Klimisch and Krueger (1999), p. 470/471.
21 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM (96) 721. See in
particular the following passage: “The current system promotes consistency and uniform
application of Article 85 throughout the Community for vertical restraints. Regulation 17
confers on the Commission the function of central antitrust authority, granting it the sole
power to declare Article 85 (1) inapplicable by granting an exemption pursuant to Article 85
(3) … In this way, decisions which involve complex evaluations of economic matters or
balancing competition policy against other policies of the Community and which may have
far-reaching consequences throughout the Community are taken by competent Community-
level authorities”(para. 191).RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 10
Restraints
22. The White Paper precedes even more the Commission’s
Regulation (EC) No. 2790/199/1999 of 22 December 1999 which
contains the new block exemption, adopted on the basis of the Council’s
prior authorisation
23.
15.  At first sight, this procedure is surprising. The Notice on cooperation with
national competition authorities, published in October 1997, is relatively
recent. Experiences under this Notice are therefore still limited. The block
exemption regulation for vertical restraints will only be applied from 1
June 2000
24. They will however lead to a significant reduction of
notifications. Why then the unusual precipitation in publishing the White
Paper in May 1999?
16.  The explanation lies of course in the “window of opportunity” which was
offered by the last months of stewardship of Karel van Miert as Member
of the Commission responsible for competition policy. During his 6 ½
years as EU Competition Czar”, he had obtained many spectacular
decisions in individual cases, the most spectacular one being probably the
famous Boeing decision
25! The White Paper is the corresponding climax
in advancing the institutional framework for EC competition policy. Its
legislative implementation might be equal in importance to the Merger
Regulation, adopted at the end of 1989
26. Negotiations on the Merger
Regulation took 16 years. It is to be expected that the White Paper’s
suggestions will be transformed much faster into law.
THE WHITE PAPER
The Need for Reform
17.  While the timing of the White Paper might appear surprising, the
fundamental reasons for the initiative are not
27. The main reason is of
course the dissatisfaction with the existing situation. DG IV’s rare
resources are absorbed by the examination of notifications and requests
                                                          
22 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1215/1999 of 10 June 1999 amending Regulation No.
19/65/EEC on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of
agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 148 of 15. 6. 1999, p. 1.
23 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81 (3) of the
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29. 12. 1999.p.
21 – 25.
24 See Article 13 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999.
25 Commission Decision M 877 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, OJ L 336 of 8.12.1997, p. 16.
26 See footnote 13 above.
27 See for the following White Paper, Introduction, paras. 1-9.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 11
for exemption, instead of being devoted to the investigation of complaints
and the launching and pursuit of ex officio procedures. Compared with
the former, the latter are considered to be much more important for the
effective protection of the competition in the EU, and for ensuring the
respect of EC competition rules
28.
18.  In addition, the conditions that not only justified, but even required the
Commission’s exemption monopoly in 1962, have changed profoundly:
The White Paper is right to emphasise that the Commission has developed
a comprehensive competition policy: that the Commission and the Court
of Justice have established abundant case law, basic principles and well
defined details; that Member States have adopted national competition
laws and set up specialised authorities to implement them
29. According to
the White Paper, these national competition policies “form part of a
coherent whole with the Community system”
30. In addition, the overall
context of EC competition policy is fundamentally different. The EU has
grown from the original 6 to 15 Member States; its population has
increased from 170 to 380 million inhabitants. Enlargement might lead to
more than 25 Member States with more than 500 million people.
Economic and monetary union will further competitive pressures, but,
according to the White Paper, these pressures might also induce operators
to take a protectionist attitude, compensating for their lack of
competitiveness. Finally, globalisation will present new challenges for
competition authorities, if markets are to be kept open, and competitive
structures are to be preserved.
The Options
19.  Before setting out the new approach, suggested by the Commission, the
White Paper examines a series of options put forward to improve the
system of prior administrative authorisation. None of these options is
considered to be appropriate to solve the existing problems.
Simplifying the Exemption Procedure
20.  It is generally recognised that one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory
function of the existing system of prior administrative authorisations is
the complexity of the procedures leading to formal Commission
exemption decisions. It is, therefore, logical to examine the question
                                                          
28 Schaub/Dohms (1999), p. 1056.
29 Sceptical about the the existence of a solid competition culture throughout the EU
Moeschel (1999), p. 510/511; Monopolkommission (1999), para. 53/54.
30 White Paper, para 4.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 12
whether procedural simplifications could eliminate the current problems,
or, at least, reduce them to such an extent that the proposed major reform
becomes superfluous.
21.  The White Paper examines some of these measures (like a reduction of
languages, a simplification of Advisory Committee consultation
procedures, and a generalisation of the so-called opposition procedure). It
considers, however, that these measures would not lead to the desired
results. At best, they would effectively improve the exemption procedure,
giving undertakings an incentive for making even more notifications, thus
continuing to oblige rare Commission staff resources to handle cases
which are less useful than complaints and ex officio procedures, and
standing in the way of increased decentralisation
31.
22.  Defenders of the system of prior administrative exemption do not agree
with the White Paper. They point to the limited number of notifications
received annually by the Commission, the probable effect of the recent
reforms for vertical restraints (which will reduce this number even
further), and the possibility of additional reforms (like a reduction of the
existing information requirements, a better use of human resources within
DG IV, and a reinforcement of its staff by the Commission)
32.
23.  It is true that the annual average of notifications looks rather manageable,
and that, in addition, the recent measures for vertical restraints will lessen
the pre-existing need for exemption requests.  It is, however, likely that,
today, a great number of agreements, which would still need an
exemption, is not notified
33. Every enlargement will increase this number.
Purely administrative, procedural reforms will not be able to handle these
notifications efficiently. Over the last 10 years, the Commission has
largely exhausted the potential of this type of reforms.
                                                          
31 White Paper, para. 66-68. See also Schaub/Dohms (1999), p. 1057, in particular with
respect to the objections against a larger use of the opposition proedure.
32 Austrian Government (1999); German Government (1999); Moeschel (1999), p. 511/512;
Monopolkommission, paras. 57- 63, 66/67; Wolf (1999). As a general rule, references will
only be made to critical comments and not to all those who agree, explicitly or implicitly,
with the position expressed in the White Paper. References in this paper may, therefore, not
reflect correctly the degree of agreement with the suggestions of the Commission.
33 According to Siragusa (1999), agreements are notified only when they involve considerable
investments and, in the absence of clear guidance by case law or Commission practice, there
are serious doubts as to their compatibility with Article 81. Sceptical about this view Hawk
(2000). Forrester (1999) notes that the best reason for notifying is not to avoid fines, but to
obtain a tactical advantage in the event that the other contracting party chooses o try to evade
its contractual obligations. Thus, filing a notification is a means of attaining the higher moral
ground in the event that a controversy arises.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 13
24.  Moreover, there is the so-called backlog of old cases. It is sometimes
asserted that the Commission could eliminate this backlog through one
single major effort
34. I do not share this point of view. It is true that during
the first years of the nineties, the existing backlog was substantially
reduced
35. However, the methods used were not all “orthodox”. The
remaining cases were and are difficult. And nothing guaranties that a
reduced or even eliminated backlog might not increase or come back
again in the future.
25.  Among the suggestions put forward by the German Monopolkommission,
there is one that seems to me to be important, though not very helpful in
the context of improvements of the existing notification and exemption
system. The Monopolkommission pleads for larger possibilities to enable
the Member of the Commission responsible for competition to act on
behalf of the whole Commission
36. In view of the excessively restrictive
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, I have already advocated in the past
to use one of the Intergovernmental Conferences to amend the Treaty in
this direction
37. It is regrettable that the recent contribution of the
Commission to the next Intergovernmental Conference does not make any
reference to this problem (which is of course not limited to competition
policy, but which extends also to other areas of Commission
responsibility)
38.
Reducing the Need for Prior Notification
26.  The number of notifications depends, i. a., on the advantages attached to
notifications (or the corresponding disadvantages of non-notification).
One of the traditional disadvantages of non-notification results from the
prohibition to grant an exemption for a period prior to the date of
notification. It is, therefore, not surprising that the White Paper discusses,
as one of the options avoiding the suggested radical reform, the potential
of abolishing, totally or in part, this prohibition. However, it discards this
option, as it would not have any influence on the need for exemption
                                                          
34 Moeschel (1999), p.511; Monopolkommission (1999), no. 58.
35 See paragraph 9.
36 Monopolkommission (1999) para. 63. See also Siragusa (1999). A larger delegation of
powers by the Commission to the Member responsible for competition policy would help if
the Commission itself (i. e. collegiate decision-making) were one of the important bottlenecks
within the existing procedures. That is, however, not the case.
37 Ehlermann (1995), p. 483/484.
38 European Commission, “Adapting the institutions to make a success of enlargement:
Commission opinion on the reform of the institutions of the European Union” of 26 January
2000, COM (2000) 34 final.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 14
decisions in order to legalise an agreement that falls under Article 81
(1)
39.
27.  The argument put forward by the White Paper is correct. The fundamental
issue is not the timing of notifications and requests for exemptions, but
the objective need to obtain a formal Commission decision declaring
Article 81 (1) to be inapplicable. What is at stake is the principle of prior
administrative authorisation, and not the moment at which this
authorisation is asked for.
Interpreting Restrictively Article 81 (1)
28.  The need for exemption decisions depends on the scope of Article 81(1).
If this scope is broad, i.e. covering a large number of agreements, the need
for exemption decisions is also great. If, on the contrary, this scope is
narrow, the number of exemption decision will decrease accordingly.
29.  The scope of Article 81 (1) depends essentially on two elements: first, the
interpretation of the terms “restriction of competition”, and, second,
whether the agreement ”may affect trade between Member States”.
30.  It is generally considered that, in the past, in spite of repeated indications
from the EC courts in Luxembourg, the Commission has interpreted the
notion of “restriction of competition” too broadly. Already since a couple
of years, the Commission has indicated that it accepts this criticism. It has
repeatedly stated that it is determined to interpret the notion of “restriction
of competition” in a less formalistic (legalistic) way, in giving henceforth
greater weight to economic reality. The new approach to vertical restraints
is a clear illustration of this determination. The White Paper confirms this
position
40.
31.  Some advocates of a narrower interpretation of the notion of “restriction
of competition” go, however, further. They propose to undertake all the
balancing of the pro- and anti-competitive economic  aspects of
agreements under Article 81 (1). For the defenders of this thesis, Article
81 (1), taken by itself, requires an economic “rule of reason” test.  If the
pro-competitive aspects prevail, the agreement does not fall under Article
81 (1), so that an exemption decision under Article 81 (3) is not
necessary. Only if the anti-competitive aspects predominate, recourse to
Article 81 (3) is necessary. According to the advocates of this approach,
                                                          
39 White Paper, para. 63-65. See also Schaub/Dohms (1999), p. 1057/1058. In favour of this
option Austrian Government (1999).
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Article 81 (3) allows to take into account non-economic objectives and
values, like the environment, employment, industrial policy etc
41.
32.  The White Paper rejects this approach. It considers that “if a more
systematic use were made under Article 81 (1) of an analysis of the pro-
and anti-competitive aspects of a restrictive agreement, Article 81 (3)
would be cast aside… It would at the very least be paradoxical [to do
this] when that provision in fact contains all the elements of a “rule of
reason”. It would moreover be dangerous if modernisation of the
competition rules were to be based on developments in decision-making
practice, subject to such developments being upheld by the Community
Courts. Any such approach would mean that modernisation was
contingent upon the cases submitted to the Commission and could take
many years. Lastly, this option would run the risk of diverting Article 81
(3) from its purpose, which is to provide a legal framework for the
economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow application
of the competition rules to be set aside because of political
considerations”
42.
33.  The quoted passage is of considerable significance. It confirms that, for
the Commission, only a certain part of the balancing of the pro- and anti-
competitive economic aspects of an agreement can be undertaken under
Article 81 (1); the rest has to be done under Article 81 (3)
43. Even more
important is the refusal of the Commission to stretch Article 81 (3)
beyond its limits, which are “to provide for a legal framework for an
economic assessment of restrictive agreements and not to allow
application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political
considerations”
44. It would probably be exaggerated to assume that,
according to the Commission, non-economic considerations are to be
totally excluded from the balancing test required by Article 81 (3). Such
an interpretation would hardly be compatible with the Treaty, the Court of
Justice’s jurisprudence and the Commission’s own practice. However, the
quoted passage is a clear indication that non-competition oriented,
political considerations should not be determinative for the assessment
under Article 81 (3). I fully subscribe to this approach.
34.  The quoted passage also indicates that, in the context of the modernisation
debate, the Commission has a clear preference for a legislative solution,
i.e. a regulation adopted by the Council, instead of introducing changes
                                                          
41 See in particular Wesseling (1999), p.422/423.
42 White Paper, para. 57.
43 Expressly endorsed by Portuguese Governement (1999).
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progressively through individual decisions, which might – or might not -
be reviewed by the EC Courts. The legislative procedure has the
advantage of speed, clarity and certainty, provided, of course, that the
judges in Luxembourg do not consider the regulation to be incompatible
with the EC Treaty, in case its legality is challenged either directly or
indirectly. Once again, I share the approach of the Commission.
Undertakings and their legal advisors should know the new rules as
rapidly and clearly as possible. They should not depend on the vagaries of
individual decision making in Brussels and Luxembourg.
35.  As mentioned earlier, the scope of Article 81 (1) depends also on whether
an agreement “may affect trade between Member States”. This Court of
Justice has traditionally interpreted this requirement in a rather broad way.
Some authors argue that this interpretation should be revised and replaced
by a narrower approach to what affects “interstate” trade
45. The
consequences of such a narrower approach would, however, go much
further than reducing the need to have recourse to Article 81 (3). A re-
interpretation of the effects on trade between Member States would
displace the borderline between Article 81 (and 82), on the one hand, and
similar provisions in Member States competition law, on the other. The
reach of EC rules would shrink, while the potential scope of national
competition law would grow correspondingly.  A re-interpretation of the
“interstate trade” requirement is, therefore, advocated in particular by
those who favour an extension of the scope of Member States competition
laws. In support of their approach, they invoke the principle of
subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5 of the EC Treaty.
36.  It is remarkable that the White Paper does not even mention the “effect on
trade between Member State” element of Article 81 (1). It refuses
implicitly to reconsider the interpretation of this additional requirement.
This refusal is fully justified. The competition rules of the EC Treaty are
part of the fundamental legal structure underlying the internal market.
This structure would be weakened if their scope of application would be
reduced, and if, as a consequence, national competition statutes, which
differ among themselves, would fill the resulting gap. The subsidiarity
principle of Article 5 of the EC Treaty does not require to re-interpret
substantive Treaty rules, and, in particular, those guaranteeing
competition within the internal market.
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Sharing the Application of Article 81 (3) with National Competition Authorities
37.  The fourth and last option which the White Paper examines (before it
turns to its preferred solution, i. e. the direct effect of Article 81 (3))
consists of maintaining the requirement of prior administrative
authorisation, but sharing the responsibility of granting such
authorisations with the national competition authorities. The White Paper
discards this option for fundamentally two reasons
46.
38.  The first has become apparent already in the discussion of the first option.
The Commission is not really interested in a different (and perhaps more
efficient) allocation of notifications. The motive lies in its conviction that
the examination of notifications does not contribute sufficiently to an
effective enforcement of Article 81, whoever may be in charge of this
examination
47.
39.  The second argument is even more fundamental. It results from the
perceived dangers of positive exemption decisions granted by different
national competition authorities. This fear is only expressed once and
almost “en passant”. It appears, however, clearly in the penultimate
sentence of the section on decentralisation. This section reads as follows:
“If the national authorities were to apply Community law and had the
power to adopt constitutive exemption decisions, there would be a major
risk to the uniform application of Community law, particularly in the
event of multiple notifications being submitted to different national
authorities”
48.
40.  Before reaching this conclusion, the White Paper examines a series of
problems, like the appropriate criterion for the distribution of notifications
among the Commission, national competition authorities, and among
these authorities; the limited territorial effect of exemption decisions
adopted by such authorities; the need to introduce in all national
competition statutes a notification requirement; the difficulties for future
new Member States.
41.  However, none of these problems seems to be technically insurmountable.
To examine the items already mentioned in reversed order: The
difficulties for future new Member States will be greater under a system
of direct effect than under the regime of prior administrative
                                                          
46 See for the following White Paper, paras. 58 – 62.
47 White Paper, para. 61; Schaub/Dohms (1999), p. 1056. For a more detailed discussion see
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authorisation, as the first involves a much greater number of actors
(administrators  and judges) than the second (only administrators)
49.
Obliging all Member States to introduce a notification system is, at least
from an EC law point of view, a smaller step than to abandon the existing
exemption requirement altogether. In addition, such an obligation would
logically have to be accompanied by a legally binding provision
requesting all Member States to enable their competition authorities to
apply directly Article 81 (1) (and Article 82). It is surprising that the
White Paper does not expressly foresee the adoption of such a provision.
42.  With respect to the limited territorial reach of national administrative acts:
It is true that the effects of exemption decisions taken by a competition
authority of a Member State would normally be limited to the territory of
this State. However, I do not see why the Council, acting under Article
83, could not extend these effects to the territory of the whole EU. In
doing so, the Council would simply apply, in the area of competition law,
a principle that has widely been used in internal market directives. It is, in
practice, the same principle which underlies the mutual recognition of
administrative authorisations, granted by one Member State, to exercise a
certain commercial activity, for instance to operate a bank or as an
insurance company. It is, therefore, neither necessary to attribute the
national competition authority’s decision to the Commission, nor to
follow the road of a convention negotiated and concluded among Member
States and leading to a mechanism of mutual recognition
50.
43.  Remains the problem of distribution of notifications among the
Commission and national competition authorities, as well as among these
authorities. It is true that the centre of gravity criterion, advocated in
particular by the Bundeskartellamt
51, is not sufficiently precise
52.
Turnover thresholds are precise, but may not be appropriate for the
purposes of applying Article 81 (3)
53. A possible solution might,
therefore, consist in combining several criteria, in order to achieve legal
certainty, and to prevent forum shopping. It is obvious that the danger of
forum shopping would be considerable, and that it should be avoided by
all means
54.
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51 See Klimisch and Krueger (1999), p. 473 et seq.
52 White Paper, para. 61.
53 White Paper, para. 62.
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44.  It thus appears that the technical arguments advanced in the White Paper’s
against a sharing of the Commission’s exemption monopoly with national
competition authorities are less convincing than those put forward against
the other options
55. The fundamental objection rests on the perceived
dangers for the consistent and coherent application of Community law. It
seems to be this reason, together with the assumed low value of the
system of prior administrative authorisation for the effective protection of
competition in the EU, which leads the Commission to plead for the
switch to the suggested regime of direct effect of Article 81 (3)
56.
45.  The White Paper could have based its opposition to the sharing of the
Commission’s exemption monopoly with national competition authorities
on one argument which is mentioned, but which does not seem to carry
the same weight as the two already discussed. The White Paper recalls
that a shared exemption system would continue to impede the application
of Article 81 by national courts, as it would not remove the blocking
effect of any system of prior authorisation, whether granted by the
Commission or by national authorities
57. The argument is of course
correct. But the blocking effect of a functioning system of prior
authorisation would be smaller than that of the actual, non-functioning
system. In addition, the role of national courts for the enforcement of EC
competition law should not be overestimated. In the interest of efficiency,
it should of course be encouraged and facilitated. However, it does not
correspond to European habits and traditions. The European model of
competition law enforcement is based on public enforcement by public
authorities
58. Habits and traditions may change. But the change will be
incremental and occur slowly. The “liberating” effect on national courts
is, therefore, one, but not a decisive argument for the rejection of the
“sharing of the monopoly” option.
                                                          
55 In favour of this option Austrian Government (1999); German Government (1999); Mok
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(1999), para. 68.Expressly against this option Portuguese Government (1999); UK
Government (1999) and EEA EFTA States (1999).
56 This becomes particularly clear in the comments made by Schaub/Dohms (1999), p.
1058/1059.
57 The limits of enforcement through public authorities, and the desirability, if not necessity,
of additional enforcement activities through private action is stressed by Paulis (2000), one of
the principal Commission officials responsible for the implementation of the White Paper.
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THE WHITE PAPER: PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE NEW SYSTEM
IF DIRECT EFFECT OF ARTICLE 81 (3)
Compatibility with Article 81
The Issue
46.  The Commission’s monopoly to grant exemptions according to Article 81
(3) was established by Regulation No 17/62. Regulation No 17/62 can be
amended according to the same procedure under which it was adopted, i.
e. according to the requirements of Article 83. But is it legally possible to
abolish the principle that exemption decisions have to be taken either by a
normative process of issuing block exemptions, or by administrative
decisions adopted in individual cases? In other words, is it possible to
transform the system of prior authorisation into a regime of directly
effective exemption?
47.  According to the White Paper, the Treaty negotiators had considerable
difficulty in defining the conditions under which the prohibition of Article
81 (1) could be lifted.  While the German delegation favoured an
authorisation system, the French delegation was in favour of a directly
effective authorisation regime. According to the White Paper, “whilst
those in favour of an authorisation system proposed wording along the
lines of ‘restrictive agreements may be declared valid’, agreement was
eventually reached on a negative wording: ‘the provisions of paragraph 1
may, however, be declared inapplicable’”. The White Paper expresses the
view that, “by opting for this negative approach, Article 81 (3) allows the
Community legislator the freedom to choose between an authorisation
system and a directly applicable exemption system. Thus, the final choice
of a system for controlling restrictive practices was left to the Community
legislator”
59.
48.  A small, but strong minority of Member States and commentators contests
the Commission’s interpretation
60. Deringer, author of the EP’s Internal
Market Committee’s Report on the proposal leading to Regulation No
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60 Austrian Government (1999); German Government (1999); Monopolkommission (1999),
paras. 14-18; Monopolkommission (1999), paras. 14-18; Mestmaecker (1999), p. 525-527;
Moeschel (1999); Mok (1999), p 318/319; Wolf (1999. It is surprising that the debate about
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17/62, expresses serious doubts
61. It is therefore worthwhile to consider
the threshold question whether Article 83 permits to switch from a system
of prior authorisation to a regime of directly effective exemption
62.
49.  In examining the problem of potential direct effect of Article 81 (3), it is
appropriate to distinguish carefully between two different issues. The first
relates to the wording, structure and context of Article 81 in order to
determine whether the EC Treaty requires a prior authorisation,
independently of the question whether paragraph 3 of this Article is
sufficiently precise to be applied directly by a judge. The second issue is
confined precisely and only to this latter question.
Wording, Structure and Context of Article 81
50.  Looking first at the wording of Article 81 (3), it is notable that Article 81
(3) does not use the word “authorise” or “authorisation”, like the
corresponding Article 65 ECSC Treaty, which clearly requires a prior
decision of the High Authority. However, even the words “may be
declared inapplicable” suggest a positive action taken by somebody other
than a judge. A judge does not normally “declare” a prohibition to be
inapplicable; it simply does not apply a prohibition in deciding a case. It
is, therefore, not astonishing that, in the Bosch case, Advocate General
Lagrange recognised, “that this [the requirement of prior authorisation]
accords best with the terms of Article 83 (3)…The theory depending on
‘l’exception legale’ would have required a different text, for example:
‘The provisions of paragraph (1) shall be deemed not to apply…’ or
simply ‘shall not apply’”
63.
51.  Defenders of the position that Article 81 (3) requires a system of prior
authorisation invoke also the references to “any agreement [decision,
                                                          
61 Deringer (2000), p. 6. Nehl (2000) shows understanding for the criticism, but considers that
the Commission’s position is legallydefendable.
62 In view of the fundamental importance of the threshold question of the compatibility of the
envisaged abolition of the system of prior administrative authorisation with the EC Treaty, it
is useful to note that this compatibility is expressly recognised (but not motivated) by
European Parliament (1999); Finnish Government (1999); UK Government (1999). It is
implicitly accepted by all those who agree in principle with the replacement of the system of
prior administrative authorisation by a regime of direct effect of Article 81 (3).
63 CJ, 6 April 1962, Case 13/61, de Geus v. Bosch [1962] ECR 45: Opinion of Advocate
General Lagrange at 56. See also Waelbroeck (1972), p. 98/99. Waelbroeck takes the view
that, according to its wording, Article 81 (3) seems to be more inspired by the concept of prior
administrative authorisation than by that of legal exception. Having examined Regulation No.
17/62 and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, he concludes, however, that the EC
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concerted practice] or category of agreement [decision, concerted
practice]”. It is argued that a switch to direct effect of Article 81 (3)
deprives these limitations of any meaning
64.
52.  In addition, opponents of the switch to direct effect of Article 81 (3)
might also draw support from the structure of Article 81. It is remarkable
that the exemption paragraph (3) follows the precision in paragraph 2 that
“any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void”. A different order, i. e. one in which the exemption
possibility precedes the statement of prohibited agreements being
automatically void, would be more easily compatible with a regime of
direct effect.
53.  However, I do not believe that these arguments are decisive. They do not
take into account what the Court of Justice has said with respect to Article
84, according to which “until the entry into force of the provisions
adopted in pursuance of Article 83, the authorities in Member States shall
rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices
… in accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions of
Article 81, in particular paragraph 3 …”. According to the Court’s
judgement in the BRT/SADAM case, the term “authorities” “include[s] in
certain Member States courts especially entrusted with the task of
applying domestic legislation on competition…”
65. In the light of this
jurisprudence, it is at least impossible to argue that the prior authorisation
would have to be a decision taken by an administrative authority.
54.  Opponents of the White Paper’s interpretation of the EC Treaty invoke
also Article 83 (2) (b). According to this provision, the regulations giving
effect to the principles set out in Article 81 “shall be designed in
particular … to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 81
(3), taking into account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one
hand and to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent on the
other". It is argued that in a regime of a directly effective exemption,
these words become largely obsolete.
66 I do not believe that this is true.
The White Paper envisages a series of regulatory mechanisms that reduce
the risks resulting from the direct effect of Article 81 (3). These
mechanisms might very well find their legal base and justification in
Article 83 (2) (b).
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55.  According to Mok, the Court of Justice has implicitly decided against
direct effect of Article 81 (3) in its 1962 Bosch judgement
67. I do not
share this point of view. In the now 37 years old Bosch case, resulting
from a request for a preliminary ruling by a Dutch court, the ECCJ was
not confronted with the question of prior administrative authorisation
versus direct effect of Article 81 (3)
68. In addition, the just adopted
Regulation No. 17/62, and its Article 9 (1), dispensed the Court to
examine the potential direct effect of Article 81 (3), read together with
Article 83. As Advocate General Lagrange said in its conclusions: “if
[according to Article 9 (1)] the Commission has sole power then national
courts must necessarily be without jurisdiction
69. Such a measure [Article
9 (1)] is, moreover, clearly within the very wide limits in which delegation
under Regulation is permitted by Article 87”.
70
Article 81 (3) is Sufficiently Precise to Be Able to Have Direct Effect
56.  Even more important than the discussion about the formal requirements of
the EC Treaty is, however, the second issue mentioned above, i.e. whether
Article 81 (3) is sufficiently precise to become directly effective. The
importance of this question can not be overestimated. If, in effect, the
answer were to be negative, it would not be sufficient to substitute the
word “declare” by another term. Instead, it would be necessary to amend
the substance of paragraph 3, in order to make it “justiciable”.
57.  Objections to the potential direct effect of Article 81 (3) are based on two
different lines of arguments, which are, however, interconnected. The first
refers to the traditional defence of the Commission’s exemption
monopoly. According to this defence, Article 81(3) requires a complex
weighting and balancing of often opposing interests, which are not limited
                                                          
67 Mok (1999), p. 318.
68 This opinion is shared by Mestmaecker (1999), p. 527.
69 That the attribution of an exclusive responsibility to the Commission excludes the
possibility of national courts to apply a certain provision, in spite of its sufficiently precise
character, results clearly from the judgement of the Court of Justice in the Banks/British Coal
Corporation case (see footnote 7 above). In this case, Advocate General van Gerven had
suggested to recognise the direct effect of Articles 65 (1) and 66 (7) ECSC Treaty, because of
their wording and the parallelism with Articles 85 (1) and 86 EC Treaty, in spite of the text of
Articles 65 (4) and 66 (7) ECSC Treaty. The Court of Justice took a different view. Relying
on the attribution of sole jurisdiction to the Commission to rule on the compatibility with
Article 65 of any agreement prohibited by Article 65 (1), the Court decided that, as long as
such incompatibility has not been established by the Commission itself, individuals may not
plead, in proceedings before national courts, that an agreement is incompatible with Article
65. The Court followed a similar reasoning for Article 66 (7), though its text is less explicit
that Article 65 (4).
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to strictly economic, competition oriented considerations, but include the
taking into account of non-economic values, like, for instance, the
protection of the environment. Through this process, the Commission
develops and pursues a competition policy. Such a process, it is argued, is
appropriate for an administrative authority, but not for a court of law
71.
58.  The interpretation of Article 81 (3) is a matter of controversy. Opinions
diverge as to whether, and to what extent, non-competition oriented
considerations may be used to justify a favourable conclusion under this
paragraph
72. However, in spite of this incertitude, the argument of the
“non-justiciable” nature of Article 81 (3) is not sustainable. Three reasons
can be advanced in support in support of its potential direct effect.
59.  The first reason is the already mentioned interpretation given by the Court
of Justice to the term “authorities” in Article 84. According to the Court,
“authorities” include courts especially entrusted with the task of applying
domestic legislation on competition. If judges sitting in specialised courts
are able to apply Article 81 (3), judges of non-specialised courts must
equally be able to do so. With respect to direct effect, the Court of Justice
has never made any distinction between different types of jurisdictions
and judges.
60.  The second reason for the potential direct effect of Article 81 (3) results
from a comparison with Articles 82 and 86 (2)
73. The Court has
recognised the direct effect of both provisions
74. Each of them is at least
as “imprecise” and difficult to apply as Article 81 (3)
75. This is
particularly true for Article 86 (2). This provision provides an exception
to Articles 81 that goes even further than Article 81 (3). It dispenses
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest of the respect of rules on competition “in so far as the application
of those rules does … obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the
particular tasks assigned to them”. The exception is qualified by the
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preliminary rulings. See Schroeter (1999).notes 28 and 29 ad Article 86.
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proviso that “the development of trade must not be affected to such an
extent as would be contrary to the interest of the Community”. In view of
the traditional lack of direct effect of Article 81 (3), it would have been
logical to deny such an effect also to Article 86 (2). However, this
argument has not deterred the Court of Justice to recognise the direct
effect for Article 86 (2).
61.  The third reason for the potential direct effect of Article 81 (3) flows from
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on direct effect in general. The
Court of Justice has accepted the direct effect of numerous provisions in
spite of exceptions, conditions and qualifications, like those contained in
Article 30, which require a balancing and weighting of opposing interests,
many of those being of a non-economic nature. In addition, the Court has
recognised the direct effect of provisions in spite of the lack of earlier
administrative or judicial practice and decisions. In the light of this
jurisprudence, doubts and differences of opinion about the precise
contours of Article 81 (3) are, therefore, not an argument against potential
direct effect of this paragraph.
62.  A final argument against the potential direct effect of Article 81 (3) is
based on the limits which the Court of Justice has imposed on itself (and
the Court of First Instance) with respect to the review of the legality of
decisions taken by the Commission under Article 81 (3). The Court of
First Instance has resumed these limits recently as follows: “The review
carried out by the Court of the complex economic assessments undertaken
by the Commission in the exercise of the discretion conferred on it by
Article 85 (3) of the Treaty in relation to each of the four conditions laid
down therein must … be limited to ascertaining whether the procedural
rules have been complied with, whether proper reasons have been
provided, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there
has been any manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers”
76.
According to opponents of the White Paper, this jurisprudence proves that
this provision contains elements of administrative discretion, which are
incompatible with the recognition of direct effect of Article 81 (3)
77.
63.  It is true that the traditional jurisprudence of the Court of Justice with
respect to the standard of review of Commission decisions taken under
Article 81 (3) is hardly compatible with the concept of a provision having
direct effect. The Court would, therefore, have to reconsider this
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jurisprudence, and submit the Commission to the same type of control as
under Article 81 (1) or 82
78.
64.  Such reconsideration might be appropriate also for another reason. It is
useful to recall that there are some doubts whether the actual system of
decision-making under the EC Treaty is compatible with the requirements
of the European Convention on Human Rights
79. The generous attitude of
the Court of Justice with respect to Commission decisions taken under
Article 81 (3) could be one of the arguments advanced by these critics. A
stricter standard of judicial review of decisions taken by the Commission
under Article 81 (3) would be a useful contribution to the defence of the
role of the Commission under Articles 81 and 82
80.
65.  In conclusion, the arguments advanced against the potential direct effect
are not decisive. It is, therefore, possible to move from the existing system
of prior authorisation to a regime of direct applicability in amending
Regulation No17/62, following the procedure of Article 83. In order to
overcome any remaining doubt, it might even be useful to clarify the
wording of Article 81 (3) in the course of the forthcoming
Intergovernmental Conference. However, such a clarification does not
seem to me to be an indispensable prerequisite for the successful
implementation of the White Paper.
The Commission's Objective: Increasing the Efficiency of Applying
Article 81
The Issue
66.  According to the White Paper, the objectives of the suggested reform are,
“in the first place, to refocus [the Commission’s] activities on combating
the most serious restrictions of competition and, secondly, to allow
decentralised application of the Community competition rules while at the
same time maintaining consistency in competition policy throughout the
Community. Lastly, the Commission considers that the procedural
framework should ease the administrative constraints on undertakings
while at the same time providing them with sufficient legal certainty.”
81
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67.  This definition of objectives could have been drafted more carefully. In
fact, the Commission pursues only one main goal, i. e. to increase the
efficiency of the EC antitrust policy. In order to achieve this objective, the
Commission proposes to adopt a system of radical decentralisation
(including the national courts) through a regime of direct effect of Article
81 (3), abolishing the actual notification and exemption requirement.
Decentralisation is a tool, not an objective. The same is true for the
reduction of the workload of the Commission, resulting from the
elimination of the requests for exemption decisions. A welcomed by-
product is the easing of administrative constraints on companies.
Providing undertakings with sufficient legal certainty and maintaining
consistency in competition policy throughout the EU are important
conditions of the reform. If they were not fulfilled, the reform would not
be acceptable.
68.  The most serious objection against the Commission’s reform proposal
focuses on the Commission’s main objective. It is argued that the passage
from the authorisation system to a regime of “exception legale” or
“Legalausnahme” would weaken EC anti-cartel policy. Though not
formally changing the legal consequences flowing from Article 81 (2), i.
e. that prohibited agreements are automatically void, it would de facto
lead to a substitution of the prohibition principle by the abuse principle
82.
69.  The “decrease of efficiency” argument is based on assumptions which I
do not consider to be valid.
The Weak Contribution of the Existing System of Notifications and Requests for
Exemptions to the Effective Enforcement of Article 81
70.  The first is that the process of prior exemptions contributes substantially
to the fight against prohibited agreements
83. That it makes some
contribution to the enforcement of Article 81 is certainly true. However,
the real question is whether a bigger contribution would not be made if
the resources needed for the treatment of requests for exemption could be
used for ex officio procedures and the investigation of complaints.
                                                          
82 See German Government (1999); Mestmaecker (1999), p. 52; Moeschel (1999), p. 505:
“Man kann von einer Annaeherung an ein faktisches Missbrauchsprinzip insoweit sprechen,
als keine Wettbewerbsbeschraenkung mehr einer praeventiven Erlaubnisentscheidung
unterfaellt”; Monopolkommission (1999), para. 6; Wolf (1999).
83 German Government (1999); Wolf (1999); see also Moeschel (1999), p. 505/506;
Monopolkommission (1999) paras. 28-32.Expressly opposed to this position Finnish
Government (1999); French Government (1999); Irish Government (1999); Portuguese
Government (1999), UK Government (1999); EEA EFTA States (1999); EFTA Surveillance
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Statistics show the great number of notifications (58% of all procedures)
compared with the small number of negative decisions (9 decisions during
35 years of application of Regulation No. 17/62)
84. It is likely that many
agreements falling under Article 81 (1), but perfectly susceptible to be
exempted, are not notified. An efficient exemption system would lead
therefore to an even greater number of notifications of unproblematic
agreements. On the other hand, agreements that are unlikely to be
exempted are and probably will never be notified. The contribution of the
actual notification system to the efficient enforcement of Article 81 is,
therefore, relatively small.
71.  When Regulation No 17/62 was proposed and enacted, the Commission
had practically no information of the competitive situation on different
markets in different Member States. One of the reasons for the
notification system which Regulation No. 17/62 established was to
provide such information. Today, the need for information through
notifications is much lower. Not only has DG IV acquired substantial
knowledge of product and geographic markets through almost 40 years of
applying Regulation No 17/62. It has also benefited from almost a decade
of implementation of the Merger Regulation. DG IV therefore does not
need anymore the notification system as a source of market information
85.
72.  Not all resources freed by the proposed reform will be usable for ex
officio procedures and the investigations of complaints. Providing
undertakings with sufficient legal security should, as explained below,
lead to some sort of partial substitute for the existing notification and
exemption procedure
86. In addition, maintaining consistency in EC
competition policy throughout the EU will require the establishment of
mechanisms of information, consultation and decision making which will
absorb resources
87. Some critics of the White Paper fear that these new
procedures and mechanisms might be even more resource intensive than
the existing exemption monopoly
88. They can also point to the probable
                                                          
84 It should, however, be noted that negative decisions alone do not reflect fully the effects of
the Commission’s activity in response to exemption requests. For a more complete picture,
one would also have to take into account positive exemption decisions which provide for
charges and conditions; positive decisions and comfort letters concerning agreements which
have been amended in the light of criticism from DG IV; and requests which have been
withdrawn because of objections from DG IV.
85 Different Austrian Government (1999); German Government (1999); Moeschel (1999), p.
505; Monopolkommission (1999), para. 28.
86 See paragraphs 76 - 112 below.
87 See paragraphs 113 - 142 below.
88 See in particular Mok (1999), p. 319/320. See also German Government (1999); Moeschel
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decrease in notifications that will follow form the recent reforms in the
field of vertical restraints
89. The end result of the reform (how many
officials are really made available for more important tasks than the
examination of individual requests for positive decisions or comfort
letters) is therefore far from being certain.
73.  However, these considerations are not decisive. A system of voluntary
notifications which functions efficiently should lead to the notification of
different cases than those notified today. The mechanisms to be instituted
in order to ensure consistency of a radically decentralised EC competition
policy will be investments in the future. They are designed to facilitate the
coherent implementation of EC anti-cartel rules by national competition
authorities and judges. i. e. a multitude of actors, throughout the EU. Over
time, the application of these mechanisms will make a much bigger
contribution to the effective enforcement of Article 81 than the continued
clearing of requests for exemptions by the Commission.
A Change in the Burden of Proof?
74.  Opponents of the reform proposals advance an argument that is more
serious than any of the objections mentioned so far. They allege that the
switch from a system of prior administrative authorisation to a regime of
direct effect of Article 81 (3) would entail a change in the burden of
proof. Today, the undertakings requesting an exemption decision have to
show, to the satisfaction of the Commission (and in the case of an action
before the Courts, to the satisfaction of the judges in Luxembourg) that
the conditions of Article 81 (3) are fulfilled. In the future, the contrary
would have to be demonstrated by all those who allege the illegality of the
contested agreement. A private party, arguing the illegality of a contested
agreement, would hardly ever be able to make such a demonstration
90.
75.  This objection can be overcome. It should be perfectly possible to amend
Regulation no.17/62 in such a way that the burden of proof remains a
matter for the undertakings invoking Article 81 (3). Article 83 (2) (b)
gives the Council the necessary power “to lay down detailed rules for the
application of Article 81 (3)”. The burden of proof issue may be part of
these rules.
                                                          
89 See paragraphs 22 and 23 above.
90 See particularly Moeschel (1999), p . See also Mestmaecker (1999), p. 525 and 528;
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Easing of Administrative Costraints and Providing Sufficient Legal
Security
The Issue
76.  The White Paper mentions as one of the objectives of the reform the
easing of administrative constraints on undertakings
91. It is true that the
abolishment of the notification requirement reduces paper work and
costs
92. However, this economy is not without a price: Undertakings lose
the legal security flowing from formal exemption decisions (to the limited
extent to which they are adopted) and of comfort letters
93.
77.  There can be no doubt that in many respects the reform envisaged by the
White Paper increases legal security. The direct effect of Article 81 (3)
will eliminate the so-called “euro-defense” in all those cases in which the
conditions of this provision are fulfilled. It will therefore lead to the
legality of agreements that today are void, because they fall under Article
81 (1), but have not been the object of a formal exemption decision
adopted under Article 81 (3). Even a comfort letter does not formally
protect against the argument of violation of Article 81 (1), as such a letter
does not have legal effects.
78.  In addition, the White Paper promises the adoption of block exemptions,
notices and guidelines
94. In a system characterised by the absence of prior
administrative authorisation, block exemptions, notices and guidelines
will acquire an even more important place than they have already today.
Of particular importance will be a notice on the interpretation of Article
81 (3), in order to clarify its scope
95. These horizontal texts will not only
be a major contribution to legal security, but also to the coherence and
consistency of application of Article 81.
79.  The White Paper also envisages the adoption of individual decisions that
are not prohibition decisions, in exceptional cases, on grounds of general
interest, e. g. where a transaction raises a question that is new. According
to the White Paper, these decisions would be of a declaratory nature, as
                                                          
91 White Paper, paras. 50/51.
92 It will, however, not reduce the need – and cost – of legal advice. According to the German
Government, these costs may even increase.
93 Hawk (2000), considers that the principal cause for uncertainty under the current system is
the over broad interpretation of the scope of Article 81 coupled with the monopoly of the
Commission to apply Article 81 (3).
94 White Paper, paras. 78 and 85/86,
95 Such a notice is expressly requested by the Portuguese Government (1999).RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 31
negative clearance decisions have at present
96. In addition, a new type of
binding decision is proposed to make commitments enforceable that
undertakings offer in order to prevent a prohibition of an agreement
97.
80.  Only for one category of agreements it is envisaged to maintain the
existing system of prior notification and authorisation. The White Paper
suggests to retain this procedure for partial-function production joint
ventures, as operations of this kind generally require substantial
investment and far-reaching integration of operations, which makes it
difficult to unravel them afterwards
98.
81.  It is remarkable, that not only opponents
99 or sceptics
100, but also friends
of the suggested reform consider the legal security problem to be one of
the most problematical aspects of the White Paper
101. They argue that the
Commission has underestimated the need of undertakings for legal
certainty. Business and practising lawyers, in particular, consider that the
disappearance of formal exemption decisions, and even of informal
comfort letters, constitutes a major loss. Comfort letters, though heavily
criticised in the past, are suddenly praised as useful manifestations of DG
IV’s position on individual agreements, even though they lack any legal
force in administrative or court proceedings.
82.  Suggestions for additional guarantees are diversified and not always
precise. Some argue for an enlargement of the exception foreseen in the
White Paper for partial joint ventures
102 Others plead for retaining the
instrument of some sort of comfort letter (or business review letter of the
US type)
103. A more far-reaching proposal is the introduction of a system
of voluntary notifications and requests for individual positive decisions.
The adoption of such decisions (and comfort letters) should not remain a
monopoly of the Commission. The task should be shared with national
                                                          
96 White Paper, paras 88/89.
97 White Paper, para. 90.
98 White Paper, paras. 79 – 81. According to the UK Government (1999), the notion of partial
function joint venture should be clarified;
99 German Government (1999); Monopolkommission (1999), paras. 33-35.
100 See Immenga (1999); Jalabert-Doury (1999), p. 505.
101 The most critical and articulate position in this respect is taken by Siragusa (1999). His
views are shared by Forrester (1999). See also European Parliament (2000), para. 12, and UK
Government which suggests to use the existing system for negative clearances for Article 81
as a whole, following the example of such clearances for Article 82.
102 Danish Governmant (1999); Finnish Government (1999); Italian Government (1999); EEA
EFTA Member States (1999).
103 Portuguese Government (1999). This seems also to be the position of the European
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competition authorities. In addition, the legal effects of individual positive
Commission decisions should not be assimilated to negative clearance
decisions. Such positive decisions should be legally binding
104.
Is Legal Security of Individual Undertakings a Legitimate Concern?
83.  The objection that the need for legal security has been underestimated can
be addressed from several angles. It can be argued that the task of
competition authorities is to ensure the respect of competition law, not to
assure individual undertakings that they comply with these rules.
Competition authorities have to act in the public interest, not in the private
interest of individual market actors
105.
84.  This argument is certainly correct. However, it may well be in the public
interest to give undertakings in certain situations an assurance that their
agreements are compatible with the existing competition rules. This is
particularly so in a phase of transition from a system of prior
administrative authorisation to a regime of direct effect of Article 81.
85.  A second line of reasoning addresses the asserted need for individual
positive decisions. US observers of the EC competition law scene point
out that, from a US point of view, the European concern for legal
certainty is exaggerated. In the US, undertakings operate under antitrust
rules that are in many respects stricter than the corresponding EC rules.
Nevertheless, companies are not entitled to anything resembling a formal
exemption decision under Article 81 (3). Business review letters are
relatively rarely requested. Why are the same undertakings, which operate
in the US without any official recognition of the compatibility of their
agreements, so concerned about legal certainty when they apply the same
agreements doing business in Europe
106?
                                                          
104 See in particular Siragusa (1999). Deringer (2000), p. 9-11, proposes a modified system of
administrative authorisation that would allow voluntary notifications to the Commission and
(perhaps) to national competition authorities. According to Deringer, voluntary notifications
should produce provisional validity, so that positive decisions would have a legal effect.
Deringer regrets the – in his view unavoidable – total absence of legal effects of block
exemptions and positive individual decisions under the system proposed by the Commission.
Rather opposed to any individual positive Commission decision outside the exempted sector
of partial joint ventures, possibly enlarged to other agreements leading to substantial
investments and far-reaching integration of operations, Italian Government (1999).
105 Schaub/Dohms (1999), p. 1069; Paulis (2000).
106 See Hawk (2000). See also UK Government (1999) which points out that US antitrust law
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86.  There is probably no simple answer to this question. One of the reasons
may lie in the traditional European competition model, in which
administrative authorities have played a predominant role
107. Another
explanation may result from the closer relationship that exists traditionally
in Europe between undertakings and the State in general. Whatever the
explanation for these differences may be, I believe that the Commission
should respond positively to the concern for legal certainty. However, one
will have to proceed carefully if one wants to avoid re-introducing the
existing system of notifications and requests for exemption through the
backdoor.
The Legal Effects of Block Exemption Regulations and Positive Commission
Decisions under the New Regime
87.  To begin with the legal effects of positive decisions envisaged by the
Commission. According to the White Paper, these decisions would
normally (i. e. with the exception of decisions accepting commitments
entered into by the parties) “confine themselves to a finding that an
agreement is compatible with Article 81 as a whole… They would be of a
declaratory nature, and would have the same legal effect as negative
clearance decisions have as present”
108.
88.  The direct effect of Article 81(3) will, of course, leave no place for
individual exemption decisions or for block exemption regulations in the
traditional sense. The White Paper recognises this in avoiding carefully
the use of the words “exemption decisions”.  It continues, however, to
mention block exemptions. It even emphasises that, “given the importance
of legislation in the new directly applicable exception system, legal
certainty for undertakings demands that an agreement exempted by a
block exemption should not then be held contrary to national law”
109.
According to the White Paper, this can be achieved by invoking Article
83 (2) (e), which allows to adopt regulations (or directives)  “to determine
the relationship between national laws and the provisions contained in
this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article”
110. The White Paper
                                                          
107 See footnote 58 above.
108 White Paper, para. 89. The reader wonders why the White Paper does not discuss the
question whether positive individual Commission decisions could have a binding effect. It is
possible that the apparent modesty is the result of the understandable aversion against
anything that perpetuates, de facto, the actual exemption system. See paragraph 91 below. See
also Hawk (2000). According to Deringer (2000), p. 7, the position taken in the White Paper
is the only that is legally possible.
109 White Paper, para. 85.
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considers, therefore, that block exemption regulations can be adopted also
in the future and that they will continue to be binding
111.
89.  If a block exemption regulation can derive its binding effect from 83 (2)
(e), the same must be true for an individual decision, adopted by the
Commission. With respect to Article 81 (1) and (3), such a decision can
only be of declaratory nature: it does not transform anymore an illegal
agreement into a legal one. However, the declaratory nature
112 does not
necessarily entail that the decision is not binding, and that any national
competition authority or court may disregard it
113. A binding effect would
be fully justified if the decision were reached according to a procedure
that allows a full investigation of the facts, and that permits the
participation of all interested parties, i. e. also of those who are opposed to
the notified agreement. Acting under Article 83 (1), the Council should be
capable of giving such a decision a maximum of legal effect, even if the
decision does not fall under any of the five sub-paragraphs of Article 83
(2).  These sub-paragraphs are only examples of the Council’s legislative
powers under paragraph 1 which allows to take regulations or directives
“to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82”. The White
Paper itself assumes the existence of such a power in suggesting the
establishment of “a new
114 kind of individual decisions in which the
Commission would take note of commitments entered into by the parties
and render them binding”
115.
90.  Exemption decisions have to be issued for a specified period
116.
Traditionally, this requirement has been considered to be an unwelcome
limitation, particularly with respect to operations involving heavy long-
term investments. Accordingly, the absence of a similar requirement in
the Merger Regulation has been regarded as one of the major advantages
                                                          
111 According to Deringer (2000), p. 7, the new system will not allow to adopt binding block
exemption regulations. According to the Finnish Government (1999), the role and functions
of block exemptions are not clearly specified; maintaining block exemptions seems illogical.
Deringer and the Finnish Government might, however, have overlooked the reference of the
White Paper to Article 83 (2) (e). The position of the White Paper is expressly shared by the
Italian Government (1999).
112 Critical with respect to the distinction between declaratory and non-declaratory decisions
the Finnish Government (1999).
113 This is, however, the view of Moeschel, (1999), p. 507.
114 In reality, this type of decision is not so new as it seems. It resembles strongly the
traditional exemption decision. According to Article 8 (1) of Regulation No. 17/62, conditions
and obligations may be attached to such a decision.
115 White Paper. para. 90. Opposed to such decisisons Mestmaecker (1999) p. 527/528, who
suspects these decisions to be instruments of industrial or employment policy.
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of the merger regime. Under the system of direct effect of Article 81 (3),
advocated by the White Paper, the absence of any temporal indication in
positive Commission decisions will be regretted
117. It seems, however,
difficult to introduce such an element into decisions that are, by nature,
declaratory. Their legality depends, intrinsically, on a correct legal
appraisal of the underlying facts. If these facts change to such an extent
that the conditions of Article 81 (3) are not any more justified, the
Commission’ s decision becomes illegal. No temporal indication in the
decision can modify this logical consequence
118.
91.  Positive Commission decisions will have to be adopted according to
procedures that respect the rights of the parties to the agreement, but also
those of third parties. The process of adoption of such decisions will
therefore remain complex, time consuming and resource intensive. The
reluctance of the White Paper with regard to this type of decisions is,
therefore, understandable.
Voluntary Notifications
92.  Remains the question whether the amended Regulation No. 17/62 should
provide for a system of voluntary notifications and requests for positive
decisions. The White Paper does not envisage such a system. However, it
states that the Commission should be able to adopt individual positive
decisions where a transaction raises a question that is new, in order to
provide the market with guidance. In practice, these individual positive
decisions will be taken at the request of undertakings submitting their
agreement for approval. The White Paper is therefore de facto relatively
close to a system of voluntary notifications and requests for positive
decisions.
93.  A system of voluntary notifications should not lead, in practice, to a
situation in which the Commission is seriously hindered in its efforts to
refocus its competition policy in putting greater emphasis on ex officio
procedures and complaints
119. Undertakings should therefore not be given
a right to obtain a positive decision
120. It must be within the discretion of
the Commission to take such a decision or not. This does not mean that
the discretion of the Commission has to be totally unfettered. The
amended Regulations No. 17/62 might very well indicate some criteria
                                                          
117 Emphasised by the German Government (1999).
118 Same opinion Deringer (2000), p. 7.
119 See Wolf (1999), who anticipates that the Commission (and national competition
authorities) will be swamped with informal requests for information or comfort letters.
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that help undertakings and the Commission in making their choices.
However, these criteria should under no circumstances transform a
possibility into a right on the part of the companies, and into an obligation
on the part of the Commission.
121
94.  A system of voluntary notifications should not create any sort of blocking
effect. Such an effect would run counter the main thrust of the reform, i.
e. the direct effect of Article 81 in toto, and its immediate applicability by
a judge in a court proceeding.
Voluntary Notifications and National Competition Authorities
95.  The White Paper does not mention positive individual decisions taken by
national competition authorities. It envisages only (negative) prohibition
decisions adopted by such authorities. Implicitly, and in line with the
rejection of the option of sharing the Commission’s exemption monopoly
with national competition authorities
122, it seems to exclude the possibility
of positive decisions taken by national authorities
123.
96.  If one recognises the legitimate interest of business in a system of
voluntary notifications, in view of obtaining positive individual decisions,
it is difficult to limit such a system to notifications to and decisions taken
by the Commission. The logic of the White Paper, and its insistence on
the principle of decentralisation of decision-making, leads to the
conclusion that the responsibility for the adoption of positive decisions
should be shared with national competition authorities
124. It would be
hardly defendable to abolish the existing exemption monopoly, but to
maintain such a monopoly for decisions taken in response to voluntary
notifications
125.
97.  Comments on the White Paper make abundantly clear what can already be
deduced from the White Paper itself. The Commission fears the risks that
are likely to flow from divergent positive decisions taken by national
competition authorities. It considers these risks to be much greater than
those resulting from the incoherent treatment of complaints (the treatment
                                                          
121 The White Paper does not discuss the future of requests for negative clearances. It would
not be logical to abolish the right to request negative clearances for Article 81, but to maintain
in for Article 82.
122 See paragraphs. 37 – 44 above.
123 It does not seem therefore that “the Commission and national authorities will be put on an
equal footing”, as suggested by Mersing (1999).
124 The Finnish Government (1999) finds the exclusion of national competition authorities
“strange”.
125 In favour of decentralisation of positive individual decisions also Siragusa (1999).RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 37
of which is already decentralised today). For the Commission, the risks of
divergences of positive decisions are higher. National authorities might be
tempted not to apply Article 81 with sufficient rigour if national interests
are at stake. Moreover, positive decisions might have a broader effect than
negative decisions (at least in case of the rejection of a complaint).
Finally, positive decisions are less likely to be submitted to the control of
a judge, as the parties to the agreement, who benefit from it, will certainly
not attack these decisions
126. In addition, there are the problems
mentioned already above, like the territorial scope of decisions taken by
national competition authorities and the criteria for the attribution of
requests for positive decisions.
98.  Before addressing the fundamental objections underlying the White
Paper’s approach, it is useful to discuss, once again, the two more
technical issues, i. e. the attribution of notifications and the territorial
reach of decisions taken by national authorities.
Attribution of Requests for Positive Decisions
99.  It is obvious that a decentralised system of voluntary notifications and
requests for positive individual decisions will create a problem of forum
shopping
127. Without precise rules for the attribution of cases,
undertakings will be tempted to address their requests to the authority that
they expect to react most favourably to their demand. The situation
mirrors the one under a decentralised system of complaints. While a
complainant will look out for the most stringent authority, undertakings
asking for a positive decision will direct their demand to the most lenient
one.
100.  Attribution rules have to deal with the vertical relationship between the
Commission and national competition authorities. They must also clarify
the horizontal relationship between national authorities. In both situations,
they should be as precise as possible, insofar as positive individual
decisions are concerned.
                                                          
126 See in particular the arguments advanced against the (rejected) option of sharing the
Commission’s monopoly with national competition authorities in Schaub/Dohms (1999), p.
1059. Also against positive individual decisions taken by national competition authorities
Belgian Governement (1999), at least at this early stage of development; Danish Government
(1999); Italian Government (1999); Portuguese Government (1999), see however below.
127 The problem of forum shopping is mentioned by many commentators. See Forrester
(1999); Jalabert-Doury (1999), p. 507; Siragusa (1999). According to Schaub/Dohms (1999),
p. 1058, this concern is exaggerated. However, they discuss this issue only in the context of
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101.  The desirability of a high degree of precision pleads in favour of criteria
that are more narrowly defined than those set out in the 1997 Notice on
cooperation between the Commission and national competition
authorities
128. Their lack of precision has been criticised by commentators
in the same way in which the White Paper objects to the centre of gravity
approach advocated by the Bundeskartellamt
129. It would, therefore, be
useful to examine in depth the suggestions to retain turnover criteria,
following the example of the Merger Regulation. The White Paper does
not consider them to be appropriate
130. Such criteria might, however, be
combined with others. It should not be impossible to devise a system that
avoids, as much as possible, multiple notifications and requests for
positive decisions, and allows the Commission to deal with new
problems, questions of principle, and any other matter that requires a
response from the centre.
102.  The problem of attribution is of course not limited to requests for positive
decisions, but arises also with respect to complaints. In this latter
situation, it may be possible to adopt less precise criteria, though, clearly,
a balance has to be struck between predictability and flexibility. In
particular, it might be useful to define in advance those cases that are
reserved to the Commission
131.
Legal Effects of Decisions Taken by National Competition Authorities
103.  The White Paper assumes that the legal effect of a decision taken by a
national competition authority
132 is limited to the territory of its Member
State
133. For a decentralised system of voluntary notifications, this is not
good enough, if one wants to avoid multiple requests
134. In this respect,
                                                          
128 This view is shared by Kon (1999); Mersing (1999). See also Moeschel (1999), p. 512, and
Monopolkommision (1999), para. 68, who discuss this point in the context of their preferred
option of sharing the Commission’s exemption monopoly with national competition
authorities.
129 White Paper, para. 61. For the position of the Bundeskartellamt see Klimisch and Krueger
(1998), p. 1177; Klimisch – Krueger (1999), p. 471 et seq.
130 White Paper, para. 62. In disagreement with the White Paper Siragusa (1999).
131 For precise criteria European Parliament (2000), at par. 19. See also Danish Government
(1999); Finnish Government (1999), French Government (1999); Greek Government (1999);
EFTA Surveillance Authority (1999). For flexibility UK Government (1999) and
Schaub/Dohms (1999), p. 1064.
132 It is useful to recall that the White Paper does not envisage positive individual decisions
taken by national competition authorities. According to the White Paper, such authorities may
take only negative decisions (rejecting a complaint or acting against a forbidden agreement).
133 White Paper, para. 60. It
134 Nehl (2000). In favour of EU wide effect also Siragusa (1999) and Deringer (2000), p 9.
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there is clearly a difference between notifications and complaints. A
prohibition decision with legal effects limited to the territory of one
Member State might have wider ranging psychological consequences and
lead to the withdrawal of the restrictive agreement throughout the EU. In
the case of a request for a positive decision, a limited territorial effect
would normally incite the interested undertakings to introduce multiple
notifications. As said before, such a perspective is not desirable.
104.  The problem of EU wide effect could be easily solved if the decision of
the national authority was, in one way or another, taken over by or
attributed to the Commission
135. However, such an approach seems to be
contrary to the very idea of decentralisation. Another solution would be
the adoption of a mechanism of mutual recognition by way of a
convention among the Member States
136. This road would have to be
followed, if there was not a shorter and simpler one. As mentioned
before
137, I am convinced that the Council is entitled to establish the EU
wide effect of decisions adopted by national competition authorities under
Article 83
138. In doing so, the Council would simply apply, in the area of
competition law, a principle that has been widely used in internal market
directives. It is the principle of mutual recognition of administrative
authorisations, granted by one Member State, to exercise a certain
commercial activity, for instance to operate as a bank or as an insurance
company
139.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Community wide binding effect of national decisions which he considers of central
importance for the future coherent application of the network concept. He surmises that the
Commission might want to avoid disturbance by “activist” national competition authorities.
The problem of the territorial effect of decisions taken by national competition authorities is
raised, but left open, by Mestmaecker (1999), p. 529, who considers the Commission’s
concept of limited territorial scope as an argument against the suggested reform.
135 Siragusa (1999); Hawk (2000).
136 Siragusa (1999).
137 See paragraph 42 above.
138 The problems of the territorial effect of individual exemption decisions taken by national
competition authorities have been discussed in some depth in the context of the proposals of
the Bundeskartellamt, See Klimisch and Krueger (1998), p. 1178; Klimisch and Krueger
(1999), 480 – 482. .
139 Moeschel (1999), p. 512, and Monopolkommission (1999), para. 70, suggest to consider
the national competition authorities as acting on behalf of the EC. In their view, this
construction would give the Commission rights of control and instruction. They do not
discuss whether it would also entail the EC-wide effect of decisions of national competition
authorities. Nehl (2000) goes even further. He considers that, functionally speaking, a national
competition authority, when enforcing EC competition rules, acts as a “Community agency”,
and thus has to both the substantive and the procedural rules of EC law. While the first part of
the conclusion is certainly right, the second (respect of procedural EC law) is not defendable
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105.  The principle of EU wide would, however, hardly be acceptable if
procedures before national competition authorities did not correspond to
certain minimum standards assuring the possible participation of
interested parties, in particular competitors, throughout the Community.
These procedures would, therefore, have to fulfil certain minimum
requirements in terms of publicity, due process and judicial protection.
140
The Commission has abstained from any suggestions in view of the
approximation of procedures before national competition authorities. As
will be explained later, this approach seems wise at this stage
141 It is,
therefore, appropriate to accept, for the moment, national competition
authorities decisions the effect of which is limited to the territory of the
respective Member State.
Coordination Mechanism
106.  It is perfectly possible that the introduction of a decentralised system of
individual positive decisions will require stronger mechanisms for vertical
and horizontal coordination among the Commission and national
competition authorities than the mechanisms suggested in the White
Paper
142. These stronger coordination devices should correspond to the
greater risks for the coherence and consistency of EC competition law and
policy that might well flow from the participation of national authorities
in dealing with voluntary notifications. Such a strengthening of
coordination structures seems to me to be more in line with the main
thrust of the White Paper, than the refusal of decentralisation with respect
to positive decisions. The refusal on principle sits uncomfortably with the
basic concern for radical decentralisation. It is also hardly compatible
with the idea that the Commission and the national competition
authorities form a network. The fundamental principle of a network is
mutual trust
143. And mutual trust seems to me to require, logically, the
participation of national authorities in a system of voluntary notifications.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The problem of the territorial reach of national competition authorities decisions is rarely
discussed contributions by Member States Governments. An exception is the Finnish
Government (1999).
140 See Ehlermann (1996), p. 94.
141 See paragraph 135 - 140 below.
142 Such a strengthening is advocated by Kon (1999).
143 See for a more general discussion of the requirements of the network concept Nehl (2000)
who considers that the Commission has not gone far enough in its reform proposals. Nehls
criticism can, however, also be addressed to the existing situation, in which the handling of
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Comfort Letters
107.  The preceding discussion has focussed on formal decisions. It has not
dealt with their traditional substitutes, i. e. comfort letters, Comfort letters
are not mentioned in the White Paper. It is likely that the Commission
does not see any need for maintaining a practice that tries to attenuate the
worst consequences of the breakdown of the prior administrative
authorisation system.
108.  Comfort letters are, however, useful tools to accommodate the wishes of
business to see the advantages of the actual system to be carried over into
the new regime. The Commission might, therefore, not rule out to send
informal letters, instead of taking formal positive decisions, in the future.
In a regime of direct effect of Article 81 (3), informal letters are even
much more justified than under the existing system of exemption, as a
formal decision, setting aside the legal effect of Article 81 (2), is not
needed anymore.
109.  Because of the lack of legal effects, informal letters raise fewer questions
than those discussed above for formal decisions. However, two problems
should not be overlooked. The first is the Commission’s understandable
concern that the actual notification system does not return through the
backdoor. The second relates to the activities of national competition
authorities. If, and in so far as they would participate in the issuing of
informal letters
144, the new regime will have to take care of the need for
vertical and horizontal coordination. Though not formal decisions, even
informal letters, sent by a competition authority, will exercise a strong
influence on judges and courts. This influence might even be greater than
under the existing system. It is, therefore, necessary to limit the risks for
the coherence of EC competition policy that will inevitably flow from the
activities of different national competition authorities.
Transfer of Information and of Files
110.  A decentralised system of voluntary requests for positive individual
decisions might be less in need for transfers of files among the
Commission and national competition authorities, as well as among these
national authorities, than a decentralised system of complaints. It is
nevertheless highly desirable to eliminate also in this area the obstacles to
vertical and horizontal cooperation that result from the Court of Justice’s
restrictive jurisprudence with respect to the confidentiality of information,
                                                          
144 According to the Portuguese Government (1999), national competition authorities should
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received or collected by the Commission, and the use of this information
by another competition authority
145. Regulation No. 17/62 will have to be
amended accordingly
146. At the same time, the amendment will have to
define the conditions which limit the use of transmitted files and
information (like use by competition authorities and for enforcement of
EC competition law only; strict respect of confidential information)
147.
111.  The amendment of Regulation No. 17/62 should not be limited to
eliminating the obstacles to the use of information received or collected
by the Commission. It should also address the problems of exchange of
information received or collected by national competition authorities, both
in relation to the Commission and other national competition authorities.
Strengthening the cooperation within the EC network of competition
authorities in using a regulation adopted according to Article 83 is not
only more efficient, but also more appropriate than the adoption of
cooperation agreements among Member States
148.
Similarities and Differences with Respect to the Decentralisation of the System
of Prior Authorisations
112.  A decentralised regime of voluntary notifications and requests for positive
individual decisions, as advocated here, presents similarities with a
system of decentralised application of Article 81 (3) under the existing
exemption system. There is, however, one fundamental difference
between the two. A decentralised regime of voluntary notifications and
requests operates in an environment of direct effect of Article 81 (3).
Therefore, the courts will be able to apply Article 81 (3), independently of
the Commission and the national competition authorities. In addition,
neither the Commission nor the national authorities will be under any
obligation to adopt positive individual decisions. Their position with
respect to requests for such decisions can therefore remain discretionary.
The advantages of these logical consequences of direct effect of Article
81 (3) justify, in any case, the radical reform advocated by the White
Paper.
                                                          
 
145 CJ, 16 July 1992,Case C-67/91 Direccion General de Defensa de la Competencia v.
Asocciac ion Espanola de Banca Privada (AEB) and Others, [1992] ECR I-4785, paras. 37 et
seq.
146 Also advocated by the White Paper , but of course only with respect to the decentralised
treatment of complaints, as the adoption of positive decisions is reserved to the Commission.
In favour also Austrian Government (1999); Finnish Government (1999); French Government
(1999); Irish Government (1999); Italian Government (1999); Siragusa (1999). Apparently
opposed to the transfer of files Jalabert-Doury (1999), p.507.
147 See the observations by Governments mentioned in the preceding footnote.
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Maintaining Consistency in Competition Policy throughout the Community
Institutional Particularities of EC Competition Law
113.  EC law is normally applied to undertakings and citizens by national
authorities. That is true not only for EC directives, which have to be
transposed into national law, before they become fully operational, but
also for regulations, which are directly applicable, and for Treaty articles,
which have direct effect. To mention but three examples from areas
regulated by regulations: Customs duties prescribed by EC customs tariff
are established and collected by national customs officials; subsidies
provided for by the EC’s agricultural market organisations are granted by
national intervention offices; the respect of EC’s rules limiting the
maximum amount of driving hours for truck and bus drivers are
controlled by national police officers. There simply is normally no EC
administration, applying EC regulations in individual cases to
undertakings and individuals. This is particularly true for the internal
market, which is quasi exclusively regulated by national laws, sometimes
approximated by EC directives, and administered by national authorities.
In this respect, the EC Treaty differs fundamentally from the older ECSC
Treaty, which submitted the coal and steel industry to the direct
administration of the High Authority.
114.  Legal rules that are applied by several persons are likely to be interpreted
and applied differently. The risks for the coherence and consistency of
Community policies are, therefore, considerable. The EC Treaty accepts
this risk. The only mechanisms provided by the Treaty to limit these risks
are the infringement procedure with respect to Member States, one the
one hand, and requests of national courts for preliminary rulings of the
Court of Justice, on the other. In the end, only the Court of Justice can
ensure the uniform interpretation of EC law. But even the Court can not
guarantee its coherent and consistent application in individual cases.
115.  EC competition law is an exception to the general rule. In addition, it is
the only notable exception. Under the EC Treaty, competition law is not
only enacted in the form of general rules, which are to be applied, in
individual cases, by national authorities. According to Regulation No
17/62, EC competition law is to be applied also, and even primarily, by
the Commission. In addition, Regulation No. 17/62 has established the
Commission’s exemption monopoly.
116.  EC competition law presents, therefore, a double particularity. One should
be mindful of this double particularity in the context of the debate aboutRSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 44
the future of EC competition policy, and the need to ensure its
consistency. It is, indeed, only the second particularity, i. e. the
Commission’s exemption monopoly (which has become an anomaly over
the years) which is at stake. The first particularity, i. e. the power of the
Commission to apply EC competition law directly to undertakings, is not
under discussion, and will remain. Its central role in determining EC
competition policy will not be touched, but might probably even be
strengthened
149. It is my firm conviction that this power contributes more
to the coherence and consistency of EC competition law than can be
achieved in any other area of EC law by the normal mechanisms intended
to ensure the correct application of Community rules.
117.  Compared with the overall situation prevailing generally on the internal
market, the concern for the coherent and consistent application of EC
competition law may be considered to be almost excessive. Not only the
Commission’s exemption monopoly has been defended as an
indispensable tool to guarantee the consistency of EC competition policy.
Concern has also been shown for the coherent application of the directly
effective Article 81 (1), for which the two Commission Notices of 1993
150
and 1997
151 have established special information and cooperation
mechanisms. No similar mechanisms exist in any other area of EC law.
118.  The preceding observations are not intended to criticise the legitimate
fears that the elimination of the Commission’s exemption monopoly will
threaten the coherence and consistency of the future application of EC
competition law
152. They are set out to put the reform into a broader
context. They show that a reform, which looks revolutionary and highly
dangerous from the point of view of traditional competition law, is a step
in the direction of normality from an overall internal market perspective.
119.  Returning to the specific competition law context, it is obvious that the
abolition of the Commission’s exemption monopoly will increase the risk
of divergent decisions.  There is, therefore, a considerable need for more
and enhanced cooperation between all actors, i. e. the Commission,
national competition authorities and judges.
                                                          
149 White Paper, paras. 83 – 90.
150 See footnote 17 above.
151 See footnote 18 above.
152 That the concerns for coherence and consistency have to be balanced against the
requirements of efficiency of the application of EC competition law is noted by EEA EFTA
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120.  The application of Article 81 (3) will be difficult, particularly in the
beginning. In spite of many Commission decisions and Court judgements,
there is still considerable doubt about the correct interpretation of the
notion of “restriction of competition” in the first paragraph of Article 81.
The jurisprudence of the Courts is far from being coherent. Even greater
is, however, the uncertainty about the interpretation of the third
paragraph. The scope of Article 81 (3) is largely unexplored, if only
because of the relatively few formal exemption decisions taken by the
Commission, and the even smaller number of Court judgements
reviewing these decisions. It will be one of the great merits of the
abolition of the Commission’s exemption monopoly that more formal
decisions interpreting Article 81 (3) can be expected. They will contribute
to clarify progressively the scope of this key provision of the EC Treaty.
121.  What are the mechanisms that the Commission envisages ensuring the
consistency of the application of competition law throughout the EU?
Cooperation with and Coordination of Competition Authorities
122.  With respect to national competition authorities, the White Paper
mentions essentially three devices. The first is a simple information
requirement. National competition authorities should be obliged to inform
the Commission of all cases in which Article 81 is applied. The
Commission believes that “information of this kind together with any
correspondence that may take place with the national authorities should
ensure that the consistency of competition policy can be preserved
without requiring machinery to impose solutions to conflicts in the
application of Community law”
153.
123.  This statement is, however, qualified by the caveat (the second device)
that the “Commission would still have the possibility of taking a case out
of the jurisdiction of the national competition authorities, by means of a
mechanism equivalent to that in Article 9 (3) of the present Regulation
No. 17”
154. This right of evocation is thus not really new
155. It interferes
much less with the autonomy of national competition authorities than a
requirement of Commission consent, or the right of the Commission to
annul a national decision. The latter would introduce an element of
administrative hierarchy that is conspicuously absent in the EC Treaty and
in secondary Community legislation.
                                                          
153 White Paper, para. 105.
154 White Paper, papra 105.
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124.  The apparent modesty of the Commission’s claim to maintain the right of
evocation have, however, to be read together with the White Paper’s
preceding “principles for resolution of conflicts”. It is useful to note, in
particular, both the second and the fourth principles which read as
follows:
“(2) When a national authority has adopted a positive decision
156 which is
either no longer open to appeal or which has been confirmed on appeal, or a
court has delivered a positive judgement (for example rejection of a complaint
on the ground that a restrictive practice satisfies the tests of Article 85 (3)
which is either no longer open to appeal or has been confirmed on appeal, the
Commission can always intervene to prohibit the agreement, subject only to
the principle of res judicata that applies to the dispute between the parties
themselves, which has been decided one and for all by the national court.
(4) For as long as a decision of a national authority or a court is still open to
appeal or the decision on appeal is pending, the Commission may at any time
adopt a contrary decision. In that case the principle that conflicting decisions
must be avoided will apply to the appeal body”
157.
Though theoretically correct, these paragraphs suggest a certain
interventionism that does not sit comfortably with the basic principle of
mutual respect between competition authorities that is highly desirable for
the efficient functioning of the decentralised implementation of Article
81
158. This criticism might, however, not be justified in the perspective of
a decentralised approach to voluntary notifications and requests for
decisions, advocated above. As said before
159, the extension of the
adoption of positive decisions under Article 81 (3) to national competition
authorities could require stronger coordination mechanisms than
necessary otherwise.
125.  The third device suggested by the White Paper intends to assure the
“proper functioning of the network between the Commission and the
Member States” through “a reinforcement of the role of the Advisory
Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions.” The
Committee “would become a full-scale forum in which important cases
would be discussed irrespective of the competition authority dealing with
                                                          
156 From the perspective of the White Paper, a positive decision of a national competition
authority is likely to mean the rejection of a complaint.
157 White Paper, para. 102.
158 Also critical Deringer (2000), p. 9. The Commission’s right of evocation is discussed in
several observations by Member States, asking either for clarification and/or for a restrictive
use. See Danish Government (1999); Irish Government (1999); Italian Government (1999);
EEA EFTA States (1999).
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them … [T]he Commission, acting on its own initiative or at the request of
a Member State, could also be empowered to ask the Committee for its
opinions on cases of application of Community law by national
authorities.”
160
126.  These suggestions are perfectly reasonable
161. It is, however, surprising
that the White Paper requests systematic information on the application of
Article 82 by national competition authorities.
162 Why is such information
necessary, though Article 82 is not at all concerned by the abolition of the
Commission’s monopoly under Article 81 (3)
163?  It is also surprising to
read that national competition authorities should inform the Commission
of any proceeding they were conducting under national law that might
have implications for Community proceedings
164. What is the logical link
with the proposal to allow Article 81 (3) to become directly effective?
127.  It is understandable that the White Paper is mainly concerned with the
vertical relationship between the Commission and the national
competition authorities. However, it is highly desirable to promote also
the cooperation and coordination among such authorities. The horizontal
relationship between national competition authorities is, of course, in the
first place, a matter for themselves. But the strength of the network
between such authorities is also a legitimate concern of the central EU
institutions. Interstate cooperation in the USA, more specifically the
structure and activities of the US National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG), would be a useful source of inspiration
165.
                                                          
160 White Paper, para. 106.
161 See also the observations by Member States, like Italian Government (1999) suggesting
more frequent and earlier meetings of the Advisory Committee; Portuguese Government
(1999) and EFTA Authority (1999) recommending ex ante instead of ex post coordination;
EEA EFTA States (1999) pleading for equal information.
162 White Paper, para. 107.
163 Even systematic information on Article 81 cases is considered to be excessive by EEA
EFTA States (1999).
164 White Paper, para. 105.
165 Forrester (1999) with reference to O’Connor (1997), p. 147 –185. See also European
Parliament (2000) para.20; Belgian Government(1999); Nehl 2000. See also paragraph 111
above with respect to the specific problem of exchange of files and information among
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Cooperation with and Coordination of National Courts
128.  Also with respect to national courts, the White Paper suggests three
devices to ensure the consistency of interpretation of EC competition law.
129.  The first is, once again, an information requirement that would apply with
respect to both Article 81 and Article 82
166. In view of the independence
of the judiciary, the suggestion to establish such an information
requirement could give rise to serious criticism, if such an obligation were
not already to be found in certain national laws
167.
130.  The second device suggested by the White Paper is a right of the
Commission, subject to an authorisation by the national court, to
intervene in national judicial proceedings as amicus curiae
168.
131.  Finally, it is suggested to transform the cooperation mechanisms set out in
the 1993 Notice on cooperation between the Commission and national
courts into binding rules
169. These mechanisms allow the courts to ask the
Commission for information on procedural, legal and economic issues. In
a system of radical decentralisation, as suggested by the White Paper, it is
even logical to extend the possibility of such assistance to national
competition authorities, in so far as it does not exist already.
132.  As in the case of national authorities, these suggestions for information,
consultation and cooperation with respect to national courts seem to be
perfectly reasonable
170. That, contrary to competition authorities, judges
and courts can neither “cooperate” nor be “coordinated” when applying
Article 81 is obvious
171. The reader of the White Paper might, however,
be surprised in noting the apparent confidence of the Commission that
national courts will be able to apply directly the complex and delicate
provisions of Article 81 (3). Before reverting to this – last – group of
                                                          
166 White Paper, para. 107. For the reference to Article 82, see paragraph 126 above.
167 White Paper, para. 107. Doubts with respect to constitutional laws are mentioned by
French Government (1999).
168 White Paper, para. 107. Sceptical Finnish Government (1999); French Government (1999):
German Government (1999); Irish Government (1999).
169 White Paper, para. 107. See also footnote 17 below.
170 Sceptical with respect to the strain on DG IV’s resources Forrester (1999).
171 This aspect – and the resulting risks for coherence and consistency of the application of EC
competition law – are stressed by Austrian Government (1999) and German Government
(1999). They exist, however, also today with respect to Article 81 (1), Article 82 and Article
86, like for any other directly effective provision of Community law.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 49
problems
172, it is useful to return briefly to national competition
authorities, in particular those in future new Member States.
Obliging Member States to Entrust National Competition Authorities with the
Application of Article 81
133.  At present, only 8 of Member States have empowered their respective
competition authority to apply Articles 81 and 82. Even under the existing
legal rules, this situation is highly unsatisfactory. After all, Articles 81 (1)
and 82 are directly effective since the entry into force of the EC Treaty.
An amended Regulation No17/62 should therefore oblige all Member
States to enable their competition authorities to enforce Articles 81 and
82
173.
134.  If accepted, the reform suggested by the White Paper would have
probably have repercussion on the substance of national competition law.
It seems indeed unlikely that Member States would maintain a system of
prior administrative authorisation if such a system would be abolished at
the Community level. Opponents of the reform will consider this to be an
argument that pleads against the suggestions of the White Paper
174. It is
remarkable that others see this as a logical consequence, but without
drawing any negative conclusions from it
175.
Further Harmonisation?
135.  The White Paper does not discuss any wider reaching suggestions relating
to the structure, powers, procedures, resources, and judicial control of
national competition authorities, in so far as they are asked to apply
directly Article 81 in toto. This is somewhat surprising, as the Automec II
jurisprudence of the Court of First Instance suggests that in the absence of
certain guarantees at national level, the Commission is no allowed to
direct complaints to national competition authorities
176. It is, therefore,
understandable that commentators of the White Paper consider that the
Commission has not gone far enough in its requests to Member States
governments. Some of them claim that national competition authorities
should be obliged to operate according to the same basic principles and
                                                          
172 See paragraphs 143 – 155 below.
173 European Parliament (2000), para. 20; EEA EFTA States (1999).
174 Austrian Government (1999).
175 Finnish Government (1999); UK Government (1999). Opposed to any, even indirect
change of national law Greek Government (1999).
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rules as the Commission, when applying directly Article 81, including its
paragraph 3
177.
136.  Most supporters of the White Paper will probably sympathise with the
requests for more guarantees for the efficient and correct application of
Article 81 (and 82) by national competition authorities (and courts).
However, at least at this stage of the debate, the self-restraint of the White
Paper seems to be preferable.
137.  Firstly, because the approach of the CFI in the Automec II case does not
correspond to everybody’s conception of the principle of the subsidiarity.
The true meaning of subsidiarity is better served if undertakings have to
live with the imperfections of national administrative structures in
general, and national competition authorities in particular (as well as with
the deficiencies of the national judiciaries). Under the subsidiarity
principle, it can not be the job of the EU institutions to assume
responsibilities simply because the situation at the national level is de jure
or de facto unsatisfactory.
138.  Secondly, it might not be wise to increase the suspicion of opponents of
the White Paper that, instead of promoting subsidiarity, the reform is a
disguised exercise in centralising competition law and policy in the EU. It
is, indeed, perfectly possible that the direct effect of Article 81 (3) will
lead to a broader blocking effect of Article 81 with respect national
competition law than the existing system of prior authorisation under the
Walt Wilhelm doctrine of the Court of Justice
178. For those who want to
promote and extend the reach of EC competition law, this effect is of
course welcome and even one of the advantages of the new system
179.
However, friends of Member States competition statutes will consider it
with scepticism, if not with hostility
180.
139.  Finally, the problems of disparities and deficiencies of national
competition authorities and courts can be addressed at a later stage, i. e.
                                                          
177See in particular Nehl (2000), but also Jalabert-Doury (1999), p. 506; Kon (1999); Mersing
(1999), who also advocates that national competition laws are brought into line and are
applied in conformity with EC competition rules, in order to bring about a common
competition culture. Harmonisation is also mentioned by Italian Government (1999);
Portuguese Government (1999); EEA EFTA States (1999).
178 CJ, 13 February 1969, Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1.
179 See, for instance, Paulis (2000), who mentions this aspect as one of the major advantages
of the reform.
180 See Mestmaecker (1999), p. 529; Moeschel (1999), p. 508/509: Monopolkommission
(1999), paras. 43/44. For a reconsideration of the relationsship between EC and national
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after the new system has been put in place, and practical experiences have
been made. If these experiences establish the desirability of further
reforms, in particular the need for approximation of legislation,
appropriate proposals should be made, but only at this later stage, and in
view to address proven practical problems.
140.  Among the proposals intended to maintain coherence and consistency in
spite of decentralisation one can also find the suggestion to allow the
judicial review of decisions of national competition authorities by the
Court of First Instance and, on appeal, by the Court of Justice
181. An
innovation of this type would clearly go beyond all other previously
mentioned mechanisms. Its introduction could hardly be limited to the
area of EC competition law and constitute a major change of the
institutional architecture of the EU Treaty. It seems, therefore, unrealistic
to pursue its discussion in the limited context of the White Paper
182.
National Competition Authorities in Future Member States
141.  Is it realistic to expect competition authorities of future new Member
States to be able to perform this task from the date of accession? The
White Paper is ambiguous in this respect. On the one hand, it considers, in
its introduction, enlargement to be one of the factors that make it
necessary to strengthen competition policy with regard to cartels and
abuses of dominant positions. On the other hand, it recognises,
immediately thereafter, that “any proposal to amend the competition rules
of procedure must take account of the fact that those countries, with
administrative structures that are still not very familiar with the concepts
of market and free enterprise, will have to apply them as part of the
acquis communautaire”
183.  The latter consideration is an argument that
one expects to plead rather against a radical decentralisation of Article 81
(3). However, it is not really discussed in the operational part of the White
Paper. Only two further references are made to the future new Member
States. The first can be found in the passages that reject the option of
sharing the Commission’s monopoly under Article 81 (3) with national
competition authorities. The White Paper argues (correctly) that such a
system “could prove particularly difficult for the new Member States,
                                                          
181 Opening the road for direct actions before the Court of First Instance is one of the reasons
for Siragusa (1999) to plead in favour of a construction according to which decisions taken by
national competition authorities should be taken over by the Commission, or be considered as
delegated Commission decisions.
182 This position is shared by Deringer (2000), p. 9.
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whose administrative structures might not be up to such a task”
184. The
other reference is made in the section dealing with the problems of the
consistent application of EC competition rules, arising from the suggested
direct effect of Article 81 (3). However, this reference is limited to the
promise that, in the context of pre-accession strategy, the Commission
will devote particular attention to the development of competition in the
candidate countries, and that it will provide their competition authorities
with increased assistance
185. The White Paper does not explain why a
process of decentralisation that extends to the judiciary entails lower risks
for the consistency of EC competition policy than the more limited
sharing of responsibilities between the Commission and national
competition authorities of the future Member States
186.
142.  The particular problems arising in future new Member States are,
however, solvable. They could be addressed by a transitional regime,
according to which the Commission maintains special responsibilities for
the territories of the newcomers
187. In addition, it should be remembered
that the so-called Europe Agreements between the EU and the accession
candidates oblige these countries already at present to apply the principles
of Article 81 and 82, and to harmonise their national competition law with
existing EC competition law.
188 The accession candidates have thus
assumed obligations which go far beyond those which exist for existing
Member States.
Special Problems for the Judiciary
The Issue
143.  The proposed switch from a system of prior administrative authorisation
to a regime of direct effect of Article 81 (3) will affect primarily the
national courts. Their responsibilities will increase considerably. Instead
of applying or waiting for a prior decision taken by the Commission or a
                                                          
184 White Paper, para. 62.
185 White Paper, para. 106.
186 The problems which the reform advocated by the White Paper would raise for the future
Member States are stressed by Austrian Government (1999); German Government (1999).
Deringer (2000), p. 11, considers that the switch from the existing to the new system would
be a “catastrophe” for the accession candidates. On a similar line Mestmaecker (1999), p. 525.
187 Nehl (2000).
188 See – as an example – Articles 63 and 69 of the Europe Agreement between the European
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national competition authority, the courts will have to decide themselves
whether the conditions of Article 81 (3) are fulfilled or not.
144.  Even supporters of the reform suggested by the White Paper voice
concern whether national judges will be able to perform this new task
189.
They question whether ordinary judges are sufficiently equipped to find
the right answers to the complex questions of fact and law which an
economic and legal appreciation under Article 81 (3) requires.
145.  It is true that the application of Article 81 (3) is not easy. However, as
pointed out before, it is not more difficult than the application of Articles
82 and 86 (2)
190. In addition, the present difficulties are in part
transitional. They result from the (until now understandable) absence of
any Commission guidance for the decentralised application of Article 81
(3), the scarcity of formal Commission decisions, and the lack of
authoritative interpretations given by the Court of Justice.
Qualification of Judges
146.  Remain the general propositions that judges are not qualified to undertake
complex economic considerations, or that they should not be asked to
decide issues implying the balancing of opposing interests and values.
Neither proposition is tenable. There are other areas of the law (like
intellectual property law) that require economic appraisals as difficult as
competition law. In addition, any judge who has to rule on the respect or
violation of human rights (like the principle of freedom of speech) is used
to extremely delicate and often highly controversial operations of
weighing and balancing of contradictory interests and values
191.
147.  While I am convinced that objections of principle against the direct
application of Article 81 (3) by national judges are not justified, I concur
with the view that it would be useful to dispose of judges and courts
specialised in competition matters
192. Courts that supervise the activities
of national competition authorities have in fact such specialised
knowledge. Final courts of appeal might also dispose of chambers
                                                          
189 Opposed are of course all those who are against the direct effect of Article 81 (3). See
paragraphs 46 et seq. above. See in particular Mok (1999), p. 320/321. Strong reserves are
expressed by Belgian Government (1999). Sceptical (also with respect to the reform in
general) Jalabert-Doury (1999), p.506.
190 See paragraph 60 above.
191 The UK Government (1999) states explicitly that it does not see any problem in principle
with UK courts applying Article 81(3) as a whole. Scepticism with respect to judges is not
share by Forrester (1999) and Hawk (2000).
192 In favour of specialised courts also European Parliament (2000), para. 18.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 54
composed of judges who have acquired experience in antitrust law.
However, Article 81 issues can appear in such a wide range of cases that
the generalised requirement of a specialised judge seems impracticable
and unrealistic. In no case should it be a pre-condition for the acceptance
and introduction of the new system of direct effect of Article 81 (3).
Appropriateness of Procedural Rules
148.  In addition to the concerns about the qualifications of judges, critical
observers doubt whether the existing rules of judicial procedure are
appropriate to deal efficiently with competition law matters
193. For
opponents of the White Paper, these doubts are arguments against the
proposed reform
194. For supporters of the White Paper, they are reasons
for requiring the approximation of national rules of judicial procedure
195.
The arguments and demands are similar to the requests already mentioned
with respect to the structure, powers, procedures and judicial controls of
national competition authorities. Here, too, the additional steps are
requested in order to enhance the efficiency of proceedings in competition
matters, this time of private actions before national courts.
149.  Once again, though sympathising with the suggestions for a more efficient
handling of competition matters before national courts, it is useful to
caution against too much enthusiasm for further reform. In the light of
experience, there might come a moment where proposals for the
approximation of national rules of judicial proceedings become necessary
and appropriate. I am, however, convinced that this moment has not yet
come. In addition, approximation of national rules of judicial proceedings
might be much more controversial than the adoption of EC rules for the
functioning of national competition authorities. A sector specific
intervention in the case of specialised administrative bodies (like national
competition authorities) is very different from a similar interference with
rules of judicial proceedings that can probably not be limited to
competition matters.
                                                          
193 See in particular Belgian Government (1999).
194 Moeschel (1999), p. 509; Monopolkommission (1999), para. 48.
195 See in particular the detailed arguments advanced by Kon (1999), a longstanding advocate
of allowing Article 81 (3) to become directly effective. Kon also suggests introducing “a
more decisive mechanism” for cooperation between the Commission and national courts,
inspired by French legislation. French law allows a court to transfer a file of the case to the
Conseil de la concurrence, which provides its advice to the court by way of expert evidence
on the matter.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 55
Inappropriate Inspiration by US Competition Law Concepts?
150.  Critics of the White Paper have observed that the Commission’s reform
suggestions seem to be inspired by concepts and methods of antitrust
policy enforcement in the USA, in particular a heavy reliance on private
action before ordinary courts of law.  These critics consider that it is
dangerous to follow such concepts without adopting at the same time
those elements which ensure that private action is such a successful
instrument of competition law enforcement on the other side of the
Atlantic. They refer to the possibility of class actions, discovery
procedures, treble damage, contingency fees etc. They also refer to the
greater deterrent effect of criminal sanctions, i. e. imprisonment, as
opposed to purely administrative fines imposed on undertakings. They
consider that these characteristics of US antitrust law are neither
desirable, nor do they have any realistic chance to be introduced in
Europe. However, without these instruments, the reform will not lead to
the desired strengthening of competition law enforcement through
increased private action
196.
151.  It is true that the reforms suggested by the White Paper will bring EC
competition law closer to the US model. Its emphasis on the role of
national courts (and indirectly on private action) is remarkable, though by
no means totally new. Since the eighties, the Commission has advocated a
greater use of the direct effect of Article 81 (1) (and Article 82), as
demonstrated by the Notice on cooperation between the Commission and
national courts,
197 which precedes by several years the Notice on
cooperation between the Commission and national competition
authorities
198. The White Paper considers that these efforts have been
largely unsuccessful because of the blocking effect of the prior
authorisation system
199. It remains to be seen whether this is true
200.
Perhaps this blocking effect is overestimated. It is, however, clearly too
early to judge the chances of future developments of private action and
court proceedings. Let us see whether and how they progress.
152.  The truly new element of the White Paper is the less prominent role
attributed to competition authorities, be it at EU or at national level.
                                                          
196 See Moeschel (1999), p. 508; Monopolkommission (1999) paras. 36-40; Wolf (1999).
197 See footnote 17 above.
198 See footnote 18 above.
199 White Paper, para. 39.
200 It is interesting to note that Braakman (1999) considers that the system of direct effect of
Article 81, advocated by the White Paper, will lead to a reduced application of this provision
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Taken together with the emphasis on the importance of national courts,
this signals a certain departure from the traditional European model of
competition law enforcement, characterised by heavy reliance on the
actions of a more or less independent administrative competition
authority
201. This can be seen as an application of the subsidiarity
principle in its broadest meaning, i. e. a retreat of the State and public
authorities in favour of private initiatives.
153.  The authors of the White Paper might be surprised by this
“fundamentalist” interpretation. It is more likely that they considered
decentralisation, as said before, as a tool
202.  The dominant concern and
final objective of the White Paper is to enhance the efficiency of EC
competition policy by eliminating relatively unproductive, though highly
resource intensive reactions to notifications and requests for exemptions.
Effects on the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
154.  The reforms suggested by the White Paper do not only concern national
judges and courts. They affect also the EC Courts in Luxembourg. Their
implementation will lead to an increase of the actions before the Court of
First Instance, if the Commission adopts more formal decisions, in
particular more prohibition decisions. (Negative decisions are more likely
to be attacked than positive ones). The reform will also increase the
workload of the Court of Justice, both through a greater number of
appeals, and through more requests for preliminary rulings by national
courts, the latter reviewing national competition authorities decisions or
adjudicating claims between undertakings.
155.  It is regrettable that the increase of cases will enhance the difficulties that
the EC Courts in Luxembourg have to face already. These difficulties are,
however, by no means an argument against the reform. They are the price
to be paid for a more efficient enforcement of EC competition rules. And
they are not in any way specific to the competition field. The internal
market in general requires not only well performing administrations. It
also needs efficient judiciaries at EU and at national level.
                                                          
201 See paragraph 45 above.
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CONCLUSION
156.  The White Paper is an extremely important step in the direction of a major
reform of the institutional framework of EC competition policy. Though
coming somewhat as a surprise, even before the Green Paper on Vertical
Restraints had been implemented, it has opened a debate which will
certainly lead to a modernisation of Regulation No. 17/62 after almost 40
years since its adoption.
157.  There is consensus that the actual system, based on the exemption
monopoly of the Commission, does not work satisfactorily. There is
widespread agreement that the monopoly has to be abandoned. Opinions
diverge whether it should be shared with other, i. e. national competition
authorities, or whether the principle of prior administrative exemption
should be abandoned altogether and replaced – as proposed by the White
Paper – by a system in which Article 81 (3) becomes directly effective.
The second step is more radical and more courageous. The Commission
has apparently chosen it to because it considers it to present less risk for
the coherence and the consistency of EC competition policy than the
model of the shared exemption monopoly. At first sight, this position
seems to be hardly logical. However, seen together with the fundamental
opposition of the Commission against positive individual decisions, that
would replace the traditional exemption decisions, and against their
substitute, the so-called comfort letters, this choice makes sense.
158.  The preceding analysis has shown, however, that the Commission’s
aversion against positive individual decisions is problematical. This
aversion is based on the assumption that, after almost 40 years of active
EC competition policy and practice, the concerns of business for legal
security are exaggerated, and that they can be satisfied by other means
(like block exemptions, notices, guidelines and – very exceptionally  -
positive individual decisions). However, this position may well to be too
extreme, so that more positive individual decisions (and their possible
substitute, a new type of comfort letter) are required. In that situation, the
White Papers approach to positive individual decisions taken by national
competition authorities becomes problematical. Is it really justified to
deny national authorities the right to grant such decisions, because of the
risks of diverging results? Is this refusal compatible with the perception of
the Commission and the national authorities constituting together a
network? Would it not be preferable to reinforce, instead, the mechanisms
for information, cooperation and coordination, in order to minimise the
dangers flowing from decisions taken by national authorities? The White
Paper suggests mechanisms that are relatively “soft”. For the systemRSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 58
envisaged by the White Paper, this approach seems to be wise. In a
different system, in which national competition authorities are entitled to
take positive individual decisions, “harder” coordination mechanisms
might be appropriate.
159.  The substitution of the existing system of prior administrative exemption
decisions by one in which Article 81 (3) acquires direct effect will
increase in particular the responsibilities of courts. The White Paper
shows - implicitly – great confidence in the capacity of judges, and the
appropriateness of judicial procedures, to cope with these new
responsibilities. The approach taken by the White Paper is right, even if it
might appear to be somewhat optimistic. However, with respect to
competition authorities and courts in the future new Member States, the
expectations of the White Paper seem unrealistic. For these authorities
and courts, transitional arrangements appear to be indispensable.
160.  The preceding remarks have shown that the White Paper can be criticised,
but that it is fundamentally right. I, therefore, fully subscribe to the broad
lines to the reform, and would like to see them implemented rapidly.
161.  The White Paper is not only a radical, but also a remarkably courageous
step. It demonstrates that the Commission is convinced that it will be able
to exercise a leading role in the further development of EC competition
policy even without the traditional exemption monopoly under Article 81
(3). If only for this conviction, the Commission and its DG Competition
should be congratulated.RSC 2000/17 © 2000 Claus D. Ehlermann 59
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